Effects of military development on economic growth in North and South Korea, 1945-1980. by Marenic, George T.
EFFECTS OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENT ON ECONOMIC








OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENT ON ECONOMIC




Thesis Advisor: Edward A. 01 sen




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PACE {Whan Dolo Enfrmd)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. I RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMSER
4. TITLE (ond Subllllm)
Effects of Military Development on Economic
Growth in North and South Korea, 1945-1980
5. TYRE OF REPORT m PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis
Qacemher iqai
«. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORfa>
George T. Marenic
S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERS
t. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS





IS. NUMBER OF PAGES
142
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME * ADORES*1 // dlttoront tram Controlling Ottieo) IS. SECURITY CLASS, lot thlo riport)
Unclassified
IS*. OECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol (hl» fioport)
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (oi tho ooottmct ontorod In Block 30, II fittoront from Koport)
It. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
It. KEY WORDS (Contlnuo on rororoo »!*• It nocooomty and Idontttr «T Woe* numoor)
Military Development Indigenous Production
Economic Growth Defense Spending
Arms Transfers Economic Systems
Strategic Environment Financial Constraints
Military Development Patterrjs
Economic Growth Patterns
20. ABSTRACT (Conilnuo on rororoo *tdo It noeotmory mnd tdontltr or *locm ••or)
Since the end of the Korean War, both Koreas have maintained their
military forces in a high state of readiness. Until recently, the strategic
environment on the Korean Peninsula was largely determined by the quantity
and quality of arms supplied by major allies. Since the late 1960's,
however, both North and South Korea have pursured policies to develop
their own indigenous arms industries, expanded their defense budgets,




EOITION OF I NOV «t IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0103-014- 660 J UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOE (Whon Dmto Kntorod)

tmcvmr * cl *««i»'C* now Q» tun MWWg n.n «»—
«
It is the hypothesis of this thesis that North Korea is more
adversely affected by defense spending than South Korea. Although
North and South Korea have structurally different economic systems,
the same set of financial constraints apply for each, dy parallel-
ing military development and economic growth patterns for both
North and South Korea, evidence of different effects of defense
spending on economic growth of the two countries can be determined.
These findings will then be used to project the prospects for peace
and stability in the Korean Peninsula in the 1980's.
DD ForrB 1473
1 Jan 73 2
___________S/ N 0102-014-6601 stcu«i»» cu*Mirie*Tioii or tmii **otr*»»« o«

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
Effects of Military Development on Economic
Growth in North and South Korea, 1945-1980
by
George T. Marenic
Captain, United States Air Force
B.S., Baptist College at Charleston, 1974
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






Since the end of the Korean War, both Koreas have maintained their
military forces in a high state of readiness. Until recently, the stra-
tegic environment on the Korean Peninsula was largely determined by the
quantity and quality of arms supplied by major allies. Since the late
1960's, however, both North and South Korea have pursued policies to
develop their own indigenous arms industries, expanded their defense
budgets, and implemented military modernization programs.
It is the hypothesis of this thesis that North Korea is more
adversely affected by defense spending than South Korea. Although North
and South Korea have structurally different economic systems, the same
set of financial constraints apply for each. By paralleling military
development and economic growth patterns for both North and South Korea,
evidence of different effects of defense spending on economic growth of
the two countries can be determined. These findings will then be used
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PREPARATORY REMARKS AND METHODOLOGY
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, both Koreas have maintained
their military forces in a high state of readiness. The inherent
dangers of maintaining a prolonged high state of readiness are obvious-
full scale war could erupt in a matter of hours. The dangers of a war
on the Korean Peninsula extend beyond the two Korean states to tneir
major allies who would undoubtedly become involved in a major Korean
conflict. Thus, stability in this strategic area has been a key
element in determining policy for the major powers as well as the
two Koreas.
Although there has been relative stability on the Korean Peninsula
since the end of the Korean War, the strategic environment has been
in a perpetual state of change. Until recently the strategic environ-
ment was largely determined by the quantity and quality of arms
supplied to North and South Korea by major allies. However, since
the late 1960's, both North and South Korea have pursued policies to
develop their own indigenous arms industries, expanded their defense
budgets, and implemented modernization programs for their militaries.
A consequence of these developments has been a reduction in the
ability of the major power allies to influence the actions of the
Koreans.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the military and economic
forces acting upon the Korean Peninsula to determine the effects of
10

military development on economic growth. This will require analysis
of arms transfers, the development of indigenous arms capabilities,
and actual military force development. The effects of military spend-
ing on economic growth will then be analyzed and used to determine if
efforts to achieve economic goals for the 1980* s will lessen military
competition between the two Koreas.
Chapter I will establish the background from which the military
competition grew. Major events from the Cairo Conference of 1943 to
the outbreak of the Korean War will be examined. Special consider-
ations will be given to the conditions that allowed North Korea to
develop sufficient military strength to invade the South in 1950.
Chapter II examines the effect that arms transfers have had on the
strategic environment of Korea from 1945-1979. Arms transfers to both
North and South Korea will be analyzed in a chronological order by
year groupings: the pre-Korean War years (1945-1950), the War years
(1950-1953), the first decade (1953-1960), the second decade (1960-
1970), and the third decade (1970-1980).
Chapter III will discuss the development of indigenous arms produc-
tion in both Koreas, and the ramifications of autonomous defense
industries on regional and international stability. It will present
the motives for developing arms industries, actual arms productions




Chapter IV provides an in-depth study of the military estaolish-
ments of both 'torth and South Korea. This chapter examines the
military objectives of both countries, the patterns of military
development, and the current military situation of both countries.
Chapter V examines the effect of defense spending on economic
growth. In this chapter, the economic growth pattern of both Koreas
(from 1945-1979), and the effects of defense spending on economic
growth will be determined. A financial constraint model, developed
by Professors Looney and Fredricksen, will be used to explain why
defense spending has different impacts on economic growth in North
and South Korea.
Chapter VI presents projections of the military and economic
situation on the Korean Peninsula in the 1980' s. Using the findings
from the previous chapters, the prospect for peace and stability will
be explored.
3. BACKGROUND
At the 1943 Cairo Conference, a joint statement was made by
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek, and Winston Churchill declaring
that after the surrender of Japan, Korea would become free and indepen-
dent—in due course. This was reconfirmed by the 1945 Potsdam
Declaration, and subsequently by the Soviet Union, which declared
war on Japan. However, the fate of Korea changed overnight; at the
1945 Yalta Conference, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain,
12

and the Soviet Union reached a secret agreement which included
dividing the Korean Peninsula at the 38th parallel to facilitate
1
in disarming Japanese forces.
In accordance with the Yalta agreement, the Soviet Union promptly
dispatched forces to the area north of the 38th parallel and established
a military government which eventually helped to solidify the North
Korean Communist regime. The United States forces moved into South
Korea and established another military government. However, the United
States still claimed that the 38th parallel was not a political
demarcation, but a temporary expedient to facilitate military operations.
When the initial efforts to reunite Korea failed, a conference of
2foreign ministers convened to settle the matter.
An agreement was reached stating that Korea would become independent
after five years under the joint trusteeship of the United States, Sreat
Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. Under the auspices of this
agreement, a joint commission of the United States and the Soviet Union
was convened in Seoul in March 1946 to assist in establishing a
unified government for Korea. When these efforts failed, the United
States decided to take the matter to the United Nations.
The United Nations adopted a resolution on 14 November 1947 which
called for general elections under the supervision of a United Nations
commission. Elections were held on 10 May 1948 in South Korea only,
because the Soviet military commander refused the U.N. Commission
access to North Korea. On 15 August 1948, the Government of the
13

Republic of Korea was inaugurated with Syngman Rhee as its first
President.
North Korea countered with its own elections on 9 September 1948,
establishing the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.
C. MILITARY COMPETITION
The quest for military superiority began early between the Koreas.
North Korea had established a full-fledged army, with 200,000 regular
soldiers, by February 1948. Conversely, South Korea had about 50,500
soldiers when it was inaugurated in August 1948.
1 . North Korea
One of the first acts of the newly-formed North Korean Govern-
ment was to create a large standing army. Under Soviet guidance,
conscription was introduced, military training schools established,
and training of cadets and officers begun. The first units were
activated in February 1946. By 1947, force levels rose to 150,000,
and to 200,000 by 1948. Formal establishment of the Korean People's
Army was announced in February 1948— seven months prior to the
establishment of the Democratic Republic.
The Soviet Union was the sole supplier of military equipment to
North Korea between 1945 and 1950. During this time, economic and
military aid supplied to the North was estimated to value $56 million
dollars. Arms provided to North Korea included 242 Soviet-built T-34
tanks which were considered the best tanks in the world at that time.
Their ground forces were supplied with advanced artillery and mortars
14

of Soviet design. The Soviets also had put over 200 planes in Aorth
Korea, including the Yak-9P fighters, and 11-10 bombs.
2. South Korea
The buildup of forces in North Korea went almost undetected
by the United States which was preoccupied with the containment of
communism in Europe. Thus, when Soviet and American troops were
Q
withdrawn from Korea in 1948, a large military imbalance existed.
South Korea's military was totally inadequate to defend itself
against the North Korean invasion in 1950. Although South Korean
forces had been provided with some weapons and training, a precaution
had been taken by the American Occupation Army to arm South Korean
forces with only light defensive weapons.
Although part of the blame for South Korea's inadequate defense
capability can be placed on the U.S., most of the blame must go to the
ROK President, Rhee. Former Ambassador John S. Muccio explained the
American position:
President Rhee had a very unrealistic attitude
toward that whole issue. He thought that the people
of the North were waiting for him to arrive on a
white charger, that they would all get up and acclaim
him, and that Korea would be unified. And ... as
many incursions took place north of the 38th parallel,
as well as south of it, that tied our hands, there
was a danger that aggression would occur from the
South. 11
Therefore, when the Korean War began in 1950, South Korea's military




II. ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE KOREAS
Arms transfers to both North and South Korea played a significant
role in the development of their military forces. Until they were
able to establish their own indigenous arms industries, both were
totally dependent on arms imports to equip their forces. Therefore,
in a study of Korean military development, there is no better place
to begin than with arms transfers.
This chapter will present a chronological study of arms transfers
beginning with the prewar period, 1945-1950, followed by an examina-
tion of arms transfers during the Korean War, 1950-53. The study
will then shift to an examination of arms transfers by decades.
This will allow for better trend analysis. Transfers to North Korea
will be discussed first, followed by transfers to South Korea, with
a comparison of trends in arms transfers during that decade.
A, PREWAR, 1945-1950
The prewar timeframe is important because of the events that
transpired in arms transfers during this period which influenced
the course of the war. The development of the armed forces in both
Koreas were discussed in the previous chapter. However, a little






The Soviet Union entirely dominated North Korea during this
period. They were the sole supplier of arms, ammunition, gasoline,
vehicles, and other military items. Soviet aid, both economic and
military, is estimated to have been $56 million between 1945 and
1950J After the Soviets withdrew their troops in 1949, the North
Koreans were provided with large deliveries of tanks, trucks, artillery,
and war planes. Included in the 242 Soviet tanks furnished under this
aid program were the T-34's, which were believed to be the best tank
in the world at that time. Also, the 150 war planes supplied to
North Korea included modern 11-10 bombers, and Yak-9P fighter planes.
The Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War led to a change
of Chinese support from South Korea to North Korea. Prior to their
1949 expulsion, the ruling Chinese Government, the Koumintang (KMT)
had supported South Korea. However, due to the Civil War, the KMT
was in no position to provide aid to South Korea. Likewise, the poor
state of China following the Civil War left the Chinese Communists
unable to support the North Koreans. Thus, China played no signifi-
cant role in arms transfers to either North or South Korea during
this period.
2. South Korea
South Korea found itself part of the United States "forward
defense areas" following World War II. These areas were designed to
contain communism, and were mostly comprised of countries contiguous
17

to Russia and China. The magnitude of military aid and arms
supplied to these countries varied proportionately to the United
States' perceived threat in the area, and the U.S. willingness to
commit troops to that area.
The U.S. approach to South Korea before the outbreak of the
Korean War could best be described as ambivalent. Due to the action
of the Rhee Government, the U.S. Occupation Army had equipped South
Korea only with light arms and mortars, and provided some technical
training, but the U.S. had taken "the precaution to arm the South
Korean Army only with light defensive weapons to preclude any temp-
tation to invade North Korea."4
B. THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
The Korean War began June 25, 1950, when the North Koreans invaded
the South. This shifted the U.S. military assistance program for South
Korea from limited assistance to direct intervention and massive aid.
In turn, North Korea received comparable aid from the Soviet Union,
as well as direct Chinese intervention.
The Korean War was the first example of supplier/recipient inter-
dependence in a limited war due to a polarized world environment.
5
Although the conflict was initially only between the two Koreas, it
became increasingly a superpower competition. This was reflected by
the interdependence of suppliers and receivers. A paradox of arms
transfers in a polarized international situation emerged; opposing
suppliers became increasingly involved in the conflict despite earnest
18

efforts to remain detached. By furnishing weapons, both the Soviet
Union and the United States were supporting their respective allies.
Neither superpower could allow their ally to be defeated, because a
defeat of the recipient would be considered a defeat of the supplier.
The paradox of the Korean conflict culminated in direct interven-
tion by armed forces of the suppliers. The U.S. intervened to keep
South Korea from being defeated, thus shifting the military advantage
to the South Koreans. This required the opposing side to intervene
to restore the balance. Although the Soviets did not directly inter-
vene, their ally China supplied 2.5 million Chinese volunteers.*5
Another aspect of supplier/recipient interdependence in this
polarized conflict is the inability of the suppliers to withdraw
support. Again, the perception of supplier/ recipient defeat was the
underlying factor. This perception caused the Soviets to pressure
North Korea and China to accept an "in place" armistice in 1953.
The pressure increased as the Soviets became more apprehensive of
becoming physically involved.
1 . North Korea
During the Korean War, military aid to North Korea consisted
mainly of aircraft, tanks, and artillery. (See Appendix A, Table 15.)
Included in the equipment supplied to North Korea were 200 jet
fighter aircraft, and 450 T-34 tanks.
Although North Korea received massive Soviet and Chinese
support, their armed forces were decimated by the war. Their Army
19

suffered enormous casualties and equipment losses. Similarly, the
Korean People's Armed Forces Air Corps had to completely regroup




Like its enemy, South Korea received a tremendous amount of
military equipment during the Korean War. (See Appendix A, Table 16.)
Included in this aid were over 800 tanks, mostly M-47's or M-48's,
and Sherman- types. Unlike North Korea, they did not receive any
jet aircraft; they relied totally on U.S. air cover. The bulk of
the military aid consisted of infantry weaponry commensurate with
9
South Korean capabilities.
The South Korean forces emerged from the war in a little
better condition than did those of the North. Although their Army
was intact, it relied heavily on the United States for support.
The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) consisted only of limited
numbers of older propeller- type aircraft with few supplies. The
Navy emerged from the war a little better equipped, but it presented
no real threat to North Korea.
The enormous cost of the Korean War fell mainly on the United
States and the Soviet Union. Between 1950 and 1953, almost three-
fourths of all global major arms transfers were to the Koreas. Both
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. experienced the dangers of supplier/recip-
ient interdependence in a polarized world during a conflict. The
20

experiences of the Korean War led to restraint in arms transfers
to the Korean Peninsula by both suppliers. This condition still
exists today.
C. THE FIRST DECADE, 1953-1960
The armistice agreement ending the Korean War prohibited the
introduction of new weapons to the Peninsula, and froze combat
aircraft at the existing level. This agreement was short-lived.
(See Appendix A, Table 15.)
By 1955, the Soviets had increased the number of bombers supplied
to North Korea, and by 1956 they had introduced a new aircraft weapon
system, the MIG-17 fighters. The agreement stood until 1958, at
which time it was voided by the United Nations Command for "alleged
North Korean nonadherence.
1. North Korea
The period following the Korean War was used by Kim II -sung
to reconsolidate his political power. Any lesser leader could not
have survived the resentment generated by the failure to win the war.
The North Koreans channeled most of their resentment toward the
Soviets, because of their initiation of the armistice process. Many
North Korean leaders directly blamed the Soviets for their failure,
and felt that the enormous loss of Korean lives had been in vain.
Kim voiced his Soviet disapproval by embarking on an indepen-
dent path of reconstruction without prior U.S.S.R. approval. These
21

efforts were greatly aided by the Chinese military presence in North
Korea until 1958. Despite this antagonism, the Soviets remained the
sole supplier of major weapons, and they retained the primacy of
influence through the summer of 1958. They supplied the North
Koreans with weapons, and trained their armed forces with modern
Soviet equipment between 1955 and 1957. This training program included
11-28 and MIG-17 aircraft. Once trained, North Korean forces received
20 Il-28's in 1955, and 100 MIG-17' s from 1956 to 1958 to supplement
their ageing IIIG-15's.
As pressure increased between the Chinese and the Soviets, Kim
II -sung embarked on an independent course. Prior to 1957, he had no
choice but to remain aligned with the Soviets because the Chinese
were unable to supply needed economic aid and military equipment.
After 1957 Kim had to walk a tightrope to receive needed aid from
both suppliers without becoming a pawn of either.
Kim's concern over Khruschev's de-Stalinization campaign and
peaceful coexistence policy, coupled with China's increasing economic
and military strength, influenced North Korea to tilt toward the
Chinese sphere. In 1959, China supplied North Korea with 30 MIG-15's,
and began delivery of Il-28's Chinese support continued in 1953-59
with the transfer of 44 11-23' s, 20 Yak-13's, and 300 Shenyang F-4
aircraft. China also introduced the first supersonic aircraft, the
MIG-19, into North Korea in 1959. Between 1957 and 1960, China




Aid to North Korea between 1953 and 1960 shifted from complete
Soviet dependence toward an independent course leaning toward Chinese
influence. The change largely was due to increased Chinese arms
production capability, shifts in Soviet ideology, and resentment
over Soviet pressure to accept the cease-fire. These events placed
Kim in an unenviable position of subservience to both Moscow and Peking
in return for economic and military aid, without leaning too far toward
either, in fear of losing aid from the other.
2. South Korea
Following the Korean War, the American policy was to provide
nuclear deterrence, but to shift the burden of meeting limited conven-
tional deterrence to local forces. This led to greater emphasis on
military assistance. Military aid to South Korea rose steadily
throughout the 1950's, peaking between 1958 and 1960. This support
served two purposes: it enabled the South Koreans to meet the threat
from the North, and made the U.S. /South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty
more meaningful
.
Actual arms transfers to South Korea during the fifties were
mostly World War II surplus items which were obsolete in U.S. inventories
Additionally, these arms were single weapons (as opposed to weapons
systems) which required only minimal maintenance and limited complex
spare parts. Although these weapons were outdated in the U.S. inven-
tory, they filled the needs of the Republic of Korea's Army (ROKA),
and were commensurate with their maintenance capabilities.
23

Air assets were an exception in arms transfers. Here the
South Koreans received 110 F-36 fighter-bombers, and nine T-33's.
These aircraft matched the quality, but not the quantity supplied
to North Korea during this same time period.
The ties between South Korea and the United states were
strengthened during the period 1950-1960. This was due to mutual
objectives based on a democratic political system.
D. THE SECOND DECADE, 1960-1970
Arms transfers to the Korean Peninsula during the decade of the
sixties can be divided roughly into two equal periods: 1960-65,
and 1965-1970. The first period was characterized in North Korea
by stronger ties to China, and in the later half, by a shift toward
the Soviet camp. Similarly, for the South this decade can be divided
into two equal periods: Pre-Vietnam (1960-65), and the Vietnam War
era (1965-1970).
1. North Korea
The period 1960-1965 marked a low point in Soviet-North Korean
relations. Khruschev's de-Stalinization policy was considered an
attack against any personality cult—which put Kim and Mao under
attack. Kim Il-sung's refusal to accept de-Stalinization, and his
pursuit of an independent political course severely strained Soviet-
North Korean relations.
North Korea concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Soviets
in 1961, in spite of growing differences. This was not an acceptance
24

Soviet dominance, however, for in this same year, Kim introduced his
Seven-Year Economic Development Plan, defying a Soviet attempt to
coordinate and direct all socialist planning efforts. The combination
of defiance in economic planning, and the refusal to accept Soviet
military command dominance, resulted in the cancellation of all Soviet
aid. 18
Although the North Koreans lost their Soviet support, they found
wholehearted Chinese support in the early I960' s. Peking's hard-line
attitude toward the U.S., and their endorsement of Kim's political and
territorial ambitions, further bound the China-North Korean relation-
ship. Although China was unable to match Soviet aid, the commonality
of attitudes moved North Korea and China much closer in the early 60's.
China increased its supply of jet fuel and spare aircraft parts
to North Korea in the early 1960's, even though they were badly needed
in China. North Korea reciprocated by reorganizing its Air Force
along Chinese lines. By 1963, the North Koreans had received 400
Chinese built aircraft, including Shenyang 4 (MIG-17), MIG-15's, and
Il-28's. Acording to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), North Korea's Air Force had expanded to 465 combat
aircraft by 1964. During the early sixties, the North Korean military
19
strength exceeded South Korea's by 200-400 percent.
Beginning in 1965, relations between North Korea and the Soviet
Union began to improve. This change can be attributed to both internal
and external events in North Korea with major allies. Internally,
25

North Korea's industrialization and economic progress was lagging
behind their planned goals and seemed destined to fail without Soviet
20
aid. Externally, China had been involved in an embarrassing
Indonesian coup, and also was experiencing internal turmoil that
21
led to the Cultural Revolution.
Conversely, the Soviets had ousted Khurschev, and in February
1965 Premier Kosygin visited North Korea enroute to North Vietnam to
begin negotiations for renewed military aid. Increased aid did
result from this meeting, but the terms of the agreement were kept
secret. However, modern equipment soon was being shipped to North
Korea. Included were late model jet fighter aircraft (MIG-21's) and
advanced surface-to-air missiles (SA-2's). Heavy equipment, including
heavy field artillery, was provided for the North Korean ground forces
22
to offset modernizations in the ROKA.
As a result of substantial Soviet military aid, the North
Korean military forces profited greatly in 1967-68. By 1967, the
North Korean Air Force had over 500 combat aircraft, including 21
MIG-21's, 350 MIG-17's, 80 MIG-15's, and 30 11-28 bombers (over half
of which were provided by Moscow). Also provided were 10 Air-Defense
Complexes, including 500 SA-2 missiles. Almost all of North Korea's
24heavy army equipment was Soviet supplied.
While relations with Moscow improved, relations with Peking
deteriorated between 1965-63. These were the peak years of the
Chinese Cultural Revolution. Although Kim continued a policy of
26

neutrality, his improved relations with Moscow were viewed by China
as siding with the Soviets in the widening Sino-Soviet dispute.
During this period, no new Chinese aid was promised, and even pre-
25
viously promised aid was withheld.
Not until the Cultural Revolution began to wind down did
relations between China and North Korea begin to improve. Chou
En-lai's visit to North Korea in 1970 brought the promise of renewed
military and economic aid. Military aid was in the form of ships,
fuel, and technical assistance. This aid was provided to regain lost
influence in North Korea, and to determine where North Korea actually
stood in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The Soviet rapproachement in the mid-sixties, and the Chinese
counter-rapproachement in 1963, did not result in a major swing in
North Korean policy toward either orbit. Instead, it served to
retrench their policy of self-reliance. The media stressed the need
for North Korea to retain its economic, cultural, and ideological
independence. A major development of the self-reliance movement in
North Korea was the initiation of construction in an indigenous arms
production industry. This independent policy resulted in the develop-
ment of a self-sufficient small arms industry. 3y the end of the
sixties, North Korea indigenously produced all of their small arms,





The decade of the sixties also can be divided into two periods
for South Korea: Pre-Vietnam (1960-65), and the Vietnam War era.
This was basically a period of transformation in American threat
perceptions in Asia. First, President Kennedy shifted away from
the concept of massive retaliation to a doctrine of flexible response.
Secondly, threat perception shifted from external intervention toward
internal disruption by guerrilla activities. The shift to flexible
response, and the refocus of threat perception resulted in a reappraisal
of the U.S. military aid program to Asia.
The decision that the internal threat within Southeast Asia
(particularly in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam) was more vital
to U.S. interests than the external threat in Korea led to a shift in
U.S. military aid. This aid would be concentrated on training and
equipping indigenous forces to counter internal threats. This decision
caused significant fluctuations in military aid to South Korea. U.S.
aid to South Korea peaked in 1961, and not until 1968 did aid again
reach the 1961 level. Despite a decrease in aid, considerable amounts
71
of conventional arms shipments flowed to South Korea.
Arms transfers to South Korea during the sixties included advanced
weapons systems. In 1961, the Nike Hercules, Honest Jonn, and Hawk
missiles were first delivered to ROK forces. Sixty F-36 fighter air-
craft were also delivered, including approximately 700 advanced
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Although conventional armament
28

continued to flow, and some new systems were introduced, the share of
U.S. aid for new procurement fell during this period. By 1964-65,
almost 80 percent of military aid grants was for ammunition, parts,
28
food, and training.
The increased involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam in 1965
resulted in a decrease in military aid given to other forward defense
nations. However, South Korea was an exception. Military aid
remained at a stable level from 1965 through 1967, and increased
annually thereafter. These levels were supplied to South Korea from
1965 as a quid pro quo for the use of Korean troops in Vietnam. An
increased level of violent activity by North Korea was a second reason
why the United States increased arms transfers to South Korea. North
Korea had instigated incidents along the DMZ, and in South Korea.
Increased attacks on U.S. forces (the Pueblo incident, and the shooting
down of an EC-121 reconaissance plane) influenced U.S. willingness to
increase arms supplies to South Korea.
Beginning in 1965, partially as part of the quid pro quo , the
U.S. started updating the South Korean forces. In 1965, F-5 Freedom
Fighters were delivered to supplement and replace ageing F-86's.
Additionally, the U.S. promised to fully equip three of South Korea's
ten reserve divisions, and to expedite the modernization of all of
South Korea's front-line forces. Subsequently, between 1966-1974,
South Korea received large numbers of tanks, artillery, small arms,
29
patrol craft, and other military material.
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Aid for operations and maintenance increased significantly
in 1969-1970. In 1969, $100 million was requested over and above
the approved appropriations to update anti-aircraft systems, patrol
boats, and radar. This also authorized a squadron of F-4-E Phantoms,
which South Korea had requested earlier. u
The decade of the sixties ended with still another shift in
U.S. policy. In 1969, President Nixon announced a new policy with
regard to Asia (the Guam, or Mixon doctrine) stating that the U.S.
would not automatically become involved in new Asian wars. President
Nixon stated: "We shall look to the nation directly threatened to
assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its
own defense."-*' Essentially, this advocated arms transfers instead
of involvement of U.S. troops in another unpopular Asian war.
E. THE THIRD DECADE, 1970-1980
Little change could be noted as the seventies arrived. North Korea
still was essentially reliant on the Soviet Union for military and
economic aid. Since 1969, relations between North Korea and China
have remained good, but China has been unable to deliver much aid to
.North Korea. Although promises flowed freely between Peking and
Pyongyang, material did not. South Korea and U.S. relations remained
strong in the early 1970's, but became strained in the mid-seventies.




Perhaps the most important event of the early seventies was the
1972 resumption of unification talks between the two Koreas. These
were culminated by the Joint Communique of 4 July 1972. Although
the joint talks looked promising, they were virtually doomed from
the start.
President Park declared a state of emergency on 6 December 1971.
This was "necessitated by the need to cope with changes in the inter-
national situation, and to meet North Korea's aggressive design."
Between the emergency declaration and the imposition of martial law
in October 1972, Park repeatedly called on North Korea to halt its
aggression. North Korea's Premier Kim Il-sung responded in April 1972
with a peace overture completely contrary to previous statements:
"It is my assertion that we should attempt direct
North-South talks right away. The withdrawal of American
troops is not a precondition for political talks. "33
Park's hard line approach, and the use of unification talks to
curtail political liberties just prior to the December election,
caused serious questions about his motives. Although talks were
begun in 1972, little progress was registered.
1 . North Korea
North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union remained
critically important during the early and mid-seventies. The Soviets
were still North Korea's major source of arms, and its major trading
partner. However, Soviet arms transfers and military assistance
brought little increased influence. North Korea, although dependent
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on Soviet arms and aid, refused to move from their position of
neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Soviet-North Korean relations,
although cool and formal, were still firm, as was emphasized by the
renewal of their Mutual Defense Treaty in 1976. Underlying Soviet
aid to North Korea was the concern that renewed violence by Kim
would undermine the SALT I agreement and the new-found detente with
the United States. 34
China remained important to North Korea during the seventies
as a counterbalance to Soviet domination. Numerous visits were made
between Peking and Pyongyang. During the mid-seventies, China
promised military aid in the form of tanks, torpedo boats, destroyers,
submarines, and fighter planes. Chinese aid promises coincided with
the North Vietnamese victory. Encouraged by these events, Kim apparently
requested support from the Chinese to renew his war against the South.
However, the Chinese only supported peaceful reunification.
It should be noted that little of the promised aid was delivered
to North Korea. The Chinese, like the Soviets, were interested in
maintaining relations with the U.S. Thus, the Chinese response of
peaceful reunification to Kim's request for support met with polite
silence.
Actual arms transfers to North Korea during the seventies did
little to improve their offensive capabilities. They received 28
SU-7 fighter-bomber aircraft in 1971, and two squadrons of MIG-21's
between 1974 and 1978. Only the SU-7 could be considered as improvement,
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since the MIG-21's were simply replacements for ageing aircraft; they
added little to the offensive capability. The ground forces were
supplied with 50 T-62 tanks in 1975, however as is shown by Appendix
A, Table 15) little was added to North Korea's offensive capabilities
by arms transfers during the seventies.
Defensively, North Korea faired better during this timeframe.
Their naval capability was increased drastically with the introduction
of the SS-N-2 Styx missile for their patrol boats. Likewise, tne
increase in numbers of patrol boats and submarines gave them a better
capability to defend the coast. In 1972, 200 SA-7 surface-to-air
missiles were supplied to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's
Army (DPRKA) thereby adding to its defensive capability. The two
squadrons of MIG-21's, although not adding much to their offensive
capability, added significantly to their defensive posture.
Overall, during the seventies, arms transfers to North Korea
reflected the mood of the times. Both the Soviet Union and China
were willing to support North Korea, but not to an extent that would
allow Kim to invade the South. Thus, there was a shift toward
defensive oriented weapons.
2. South Korea
Relations between South Korea and the United States entered
the seventies on a cautious note. Events in the Park Government,
beginning in late 1971 and lasting until 1974, caused grave concern
in the U.S. On December 23, 1972, Park was reelected to a fourth
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term by a vote of 2,357 to 0. However Park's martial law restrictions
imposed in October did not allow for opposition in the election. This,
coupled with events of Park's "coup in office" of 1971, precipitated
an adverse reaction in the United States. Placing political critics
on trial and the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung in 1973 led to renewed
U.S. protest.
The South Korean political system had deteriorated to a point
where Congress threatened to cut military aid. Congress held true
to its threat by approving only $146 million in military grants in
1975. An additional $20 million was withheld until the President
was satisfied that political rights were restored.^ This $20 million
was never allocated. The 1975 allocations reflected a $23.8 million
dollar reduction from 1974.
Events that transpired in 1975 and early 1976 made U.S.
restriction short-lived. A second tunnel was discovered under the
DMZ in 1975. The pivotal event however was the August 18, 1976
axe-slaying of two U.S. Army personnel at Panmunjom. This brutal
act triggered an immediate response from the U.S. including: the
dispatch of a carrier task force, the placement of all U.S. troops
in Korea on full alert, the deployment of an F-lll squadron to Korea,
and the patrol of the DMZ with 3-52 aircraft. 38 Additionally, U.S.
military aid appropriations to South Korea jumped from $146 million
in 1975, to over $230 million in 1976.
Under the Carter administration (1976-79), South Korea has
received more military aid than under any previous administration
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for a comparable period. Total appropriations for 1977-79 totaled
over $435 million, with an estimated $278 million in 1979 alone.
The 1979 allocation comprises over two-thirds of the U.S. aid to
the Far East. This aid is largely due to Carter's decision to with-
draw U.S. troops from Korea. The planned withdrawal was suspended
because of a "new DIA intelligence analysis" which indicated increased
39
North Korean total force levels and armor assets. Although the
troop withdrawal was halted, aid for improvement of ROK forces
was not.
The improvement of ROK forces was initiated in 1976 with the
Five-Year Force Improvement Plan (FIP). This plan was designed, at
a program cost of $5.5 billion dollars, to reduce deficiencies and
to modernize ROK forces. The South Korean Government levied a five-
year defense tax to enlarge its domestic arms industry and to pay for
the FIP. Additionally, $275 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
credits were provided by the U.S. in 1979, and like amounts can be
40
expected for the next several years.
Arms transfers to South Korea, like those to 'Jorth Korea,
were mostly defensive in nature during the 1970* s. The only real
air threat is posed by the 47 F-4-D/E aircraft provided to South
Korea from 1971-77. The sale of 60 additional F-4's was approved
in 1979, however, these aircraft are not yet delivered. Offensive
capabilities for ROK ground forces have been improved by the transfer
of over 500 M-48 tanks which South Korea converted to M-48 A-5's.
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South Korea's defensive capability mushroomed during the
seventies. With the addition of 150 F-5E fighter aircraft delivered
in the seventies to their previously acquired aircraft which included
F-4's, South Korea became quite capable of defending itself from an
attack. Further reinforcing South Korea's defensive capabilities
were over 1,500 AIM-9 and AIM-7 advanced air-to-air missiles, the
Mike Hercules, and Hawk surface-to-air missiles, and the Vulcan 20mm
anti-aircraft system added in the seventies.
South Korea's ^\ayy has been updated with American and French
ship-to-ship missiles. The extent to which South Korea's services
were improved by arms transfers can be determined by examining




The magnitude of problems caused by Korean arms production efforts
are only beginning to become apparent. Although these industries may
help preserve internal security and deter external threats, they also
carry the potential to create regional and international instability.
Many questions remain as to how serious a problem they will become,
their effects on regional and international stability, and how much
they will complicate great power efforts to manage regional conflicts.
This chapter will examine the development and implications of arms
production in North and South Korea, and their effects on stability.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF ARMS INDUSTRIES
Both Koreas have been driven by security, economic, and political
motives to develop their own arms industries. These reasons also have
pushed them to manufacture a growing variety of weapons, both for
indigenous use and for export. To date, arms industries in both Koreas
are dependent on foreign technology input; however, these inputs
have developed an indigenous data base, and increased local manufac-
turing skills to a point where most systems can be manufactured
without relying upon imported parts.
Motivation for arms development will be the first aspect examined,
followed by actual production capability. Next, the stage of indus-
trial development in arms industries in each country will be determined
by using Micheal Hoodie's model. Finally, a study of how arms
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industries development in the two Koreas will affect regional
stability, and how major power's ability to control military events
on the Korean Peninsula will be addressed.
3. MOTIVATIONS FOR ARMS PRODUCTION
North and South Korea share the same basic reasons for develop-
ing their arms industries: national security, economic growth, and
political stability. These motives are apparent in all Third World
countries that seek to develop an indigenous arms production capabil-
ity, despite the intent sometimes being disguised under different
titles. 1
1 . National Security
The foremost reason for developing indigenous arms industries
in both North and South Korea is for national security. Both countries
have lived in fear since an uneasy peace was enforced by the armistiee
agreement of 27 July 1953. The threat of renewed conflict has loomed
ever-present, fired by opposing and antagonistic regimes, both claim-
ing to be the sole government of Korea.
Dr. Donald Goldstein concluded in his article "Third World Arms
Industries" that states whose independence had been threatened typically
seek to develop local arms industries when alternative sources are
not available, or when sources are believed to be unreliable. The
future of the Governments of both North and South Korea were seriously
threatened during the Korean War (1951-53). Subsequently, both
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North and South Korea have been threatened with the cut-off of
military aid due to political differences with their suppliers.
a. North Korea
North Korea's major arms supplier, the Soviet Union,
completely severed economic and military aid due to political issues
stemming from the Sino-Soviet dispute. When this occurred in the
early 1960's, North Korea was able to turn to China for help, China
was unable to supply the quantity of military aid needed. Not until
relations were restored with the Soviet Union in 1965 did North
Korea's economy and military readiness begin to recover. This year
also was important because it marked the beginning of the development
of indigenous arms industries in North Korea. The development of
North Korea's arms industry was in direct response to the unrelia-
3bility of its arms supplier, the Soviet Union.
b. South Korea
South Korea has experienced better military and economic
support than has North Korea. However, their support was threatened
in the early 1970's because of political differences with its
supplier, the United States. In 1974, Congress commenced hearings
on the "human rights situation in South Korea". They were on the
verge of cutting aid to protest the political situation when an
assassination attempt by a North Korean agent from Japan was made on
4
President Park. Park escaped death, but his wife was killed. This
event stayed the U.S. Congress from severely cutting aid to South Korea,
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President Nixon's proclamation of a new U.S. defense policy
in 1969, and the subsequent withdrawal of the U.S. 7th Division from
Korea, pushed South Korea toward local production of arms in the
mid-seventies.
President Carter's 1977 decision to withdraw all U.S. ground
troops from South Korea, although later rescinded, increased South
Korea's fears astronomically. This led to increased emphasis by
South Korea on rapidly developing its arms production industries.
Apprehensions about national security have spurred the creation
of domestic arms industries in both Koreas. These domestic productions
act as a kind of ultimate insurance for national independence. Indigen-
ous arms production has allowed both countries to reduce their
dependence on external suppliers, and to pursue a more independent
course without the fear of loss of military efficiency due to an
arms embargo. Thus, national security has been the driving force
for the development of arms industries.
2. Economic Motivation
Secondly, there are economic motives for arms production.
They reduce foreign exchange expenditures for imported arms, create
employment, provide increased foreign exchange through export of
weapons, and realize spinoff benefits in the industrialization
process.
The need for foreign exchange and reduced cash outflow has
led both Koreas to export indigenously produced weapons. South
40

Korea entered the arms export business in 1976 with a meager $5 million
dollars in exports. 3ut, by 1977, their exports jumped to $111 million
dollars.
Exact statistics are not available for florth Korean exports,
however, SIPRI list them as the world's twenty-fourth largest arms
exporter, and fifth largest Third World producer of major weapons
systems. Recent news reports that North Korean weapons were being
used by Iran in the Iran-Iraq War seem to support the belief that
North Korea is independently expanding arms sales to gain foreign
capital, as well as other economic benefits (i.e., secure future oil
q
supplies).
Both North and South Korea currently need foreign capital for
economic development. Arms exports are a viable method of obtaining
the needed capital.
The cash flow into the Koreas from the export of weapons is
only one of many economic benefits from indigenous arms production.
Employment also is increased, and spinoff benefits are provided in
other sectors of the economy. u
a. North Korea
North Korea's economy is a high-pressure Communist economy
which works on the concept of full employment. Although everyone in
the market may be employed, many are underemployed. The development
of local arms production makes better use of labor by shifting them
from rural areas into manufacturing areas. Skills used in producing
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armored personnel carriers also are needed to produce automobiles.
This offers further independence of external sources.
b. South Korea
South Korea's export-oriented economic system also has
benefited from the development of an indigenous arms production
industry. It has allowed the unemployment rate to be reduced, thereby
cutting the need for social welfare and easing tension caused by
unemployment.
The newly developed auto industry also has benefited from
technological skills developed in the arms industry. Those skills
developed in military radio production are directly transferable to
the private production sector in TV and radio manufacture. Thus,
South Korea has benefited by increased employment and spinoff techno-
logy transferable to the civil sector.
The development of indigenous arms production subsidizes
industrialization as well as provides independence from importation
of arms. The benefits and spinoffs are not without cost, ilarkets
must be established before arms sales are made. Initial costs of
establishing an industry and buying the technology are high. Finally,
resources are diverted from other sectors of the economy where they
might have been used more effectively.
3. Political Motives
Political motives also are a factor in the development of
indigenous arms production. Fraction within the Army is the only
internal threat to the existing regimes in both .North and South
42

Korea. If the government is unable to supply the army with needed
material, they might attempt to overthrow that government and replace
it. Relying on external suppliers requires a government to meet the
13
demands of the supplier as well as those of their army.
Often, suppliers are not willing to deliver weapons systems
requested by a recipient's military force; thus, two-way pressure is
placed on the government. By developing an indigenous arms production
capability, local governments can supply their armies with needed
weapons and reduce the dependence on external sources.
Locally produced arms also allows a government to meet external
threats on more favorable terms. South Korea's dependency on imported
arms placed them in a position of inferiority which led directly to the
Korean War. Although North Korea was supplied with enough arms and
supplies to defeat South Korean forces, they were not given enough
arms and ammunition to defeat both South Korean and U.S. forces in
14
the early days of the war when victory was within their grasp.
Both Koreas have turned to indigenous production to meet
external threats. South Korea has developed a massive supply system
capable of sustaining a short war. North Korea has developed a




Another political motive is prestige. Both Koreas have
attempted to establish themselves as Third World leaders through
political and economic maneuvering. North Korean claims of defending
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itself against South Korean and U.S. troops by developing its indigenous
arms industry has been very successful in gaining prestige. South Korea
has used its economic growth and developing arms industry to offset
North Korea's Third World influence. The ability to supply arms carries
enormous clout in Third World countries. Both Koreas are making full
use of their arms industries to establish their image.
^
The development of indigenous arms industries in both Koreas
has been driven by three motives: national security, economic growth,
and politics. The full impact of their industrial development is not
yet known. However, estimates can be made as to the stages of
industrialization their arms industries have reached by using current
production capabilities.
C. NORTH KOREAN INDIGENOUS ARMS PRODUCTION
North Korea has a large and well -developed arms production industry.
Current production capabilities are shown below, by service. These
tables are only a "best estimate" of current production capabilities.
Actual production is a state secret; however, unclassified sources
were combined to establish these figures. The tables also include
equipment indigenously produced under license.
1. Army
North Korea produces all equipment for its ground forces. They
are believed to have the capability of manufacturing 20 T-62 tanks
per month. South Korean sources say North Korea may have produced
and deployed about 2,600 T-62 tanks. North Korea also produces their
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own artillery and light infantry weapons, and the ammunition for
"I o
each. The production of APC's and amphibious fighting vehicles
further adds to their military capability.
TABLE 1





















Plus ammunition for all bas ic weapons
SOURCE: Multiple Sources
Most of the indigenously produced equipment in North Korea is of
the older Soviet design. The simple design characteristics of this
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equipment eliminates most of the technological problems involved in
arms production. Being simple in design also allows for easy
maintenance.
2. Navy
North Korea has developed a small navy, well -suited for its needs.
In recent years, North Korea has been producing most of its naval
vessels. Currently they produce gun and missile patrol boats which are
ideal for coastal patrol.
TABLE 2

















They also produce landing craft and submarines which could be used
to land North Korean troops behind South Korea's forward defenses.
In addition, they produce frigates, which combined with their sub-
marine force, gives them a formidable mining capability. Although
North Korea produces the basic vessels, they still are reliant on




North Korea received permission to manufacture the MIG-21
under license in 1974. This production would be heavily dependent on
Soviet equipment and electronics. The first aircraft were planned to
be completed by 1978. To date, there is no indication that North Korea
has been able to master aircraft production. However, lack of infor-
22
mation prohibits final judgment on the progress made in this program.
TABLE 3
NORTH KOREAN INDIGENOUS ARMS PRODUCTION-AIR FORCE
Fighter Aircraft MIG-21 (?)
SOURCE: Multiple Sources
North Korea has an extensive arms production industry which
was established in the mid-sixties when military support was cut by the
Soviet Union. Their heavy industry base aided by an abundance of iron-
ore and coal has allowed them to become self-sufficient in production
of ground equipment and reduce their dependency on external naval
support. More than any other factor, the development of indigenous
arms production has allowed North Korea to pursue an independent
course of military and political development.
D. SOUTH KOREAN INDIGENOUS ARMS PRODUCTION
Arms industries have been established much longer in North Korea
than in South Korea. Until recently, the early development of North




South Korea did not enter the arms production industry until the
mid-seventies; however, by 1977 they had over $110 million dollars
worth of arms exports. This was an increase of $100 million dollars
plus over the previous year when arms sales were a meager $5 million
dollars. This enormous growth in the arms industry was fueled by
South Korea's highly skilled and educated populace, combined with
massive U.S. support. It has allowed the South Koreans to become
almost totally self-sufficient in weapons production. Thus, by the
end of the 1 970* s, South Korea had countered much of North Korea's
advantage in arms production.
1. Army
South Korea is almost totally self-sufficient in the production
of equipment for their ground forces. They manufacture all of their
24
light infantry weapons and towed 105mm and 155mm howitzers. They
have a massive tank reconstruction program converting M-47 and M-48
tanks into M-48 A-5's. Recently they started production of the
Fiat 6614 Oto Metara amphibious infantry fighting vehicle. They
also produce ammunition for all weaponry.
South Korea is still dependent on the United States for advanced
infantry weapons such as the TOW anti-tank missile. They require
U.S. technical support in the development of artillery production.
With U.S. support, South Korea has steadily increased the quality
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Plus ammun ition for all bas ic weapons
SOURCE: Multiple Sources
2. Navy
South Korea's naval production is one of the fastest growing
industries in Korea. The recently completed Hyundoi Ship Works is
the largest single shipbuilding facility in the world. This increased
production capability will supplement the Tacoma Marine Industries,
which currently produces the PSMM-5 class fast patrol boat. Although
South Korea is using U.S. designs for their fast patrol boats, they




SOUTH KOREAN INDIGENOUS ARMS PRODUCTION-NAVY 30
Fast Patrol Boats PSMM-5 Class
Submarines Small Prototype
SOURCE: Multiple Sources
South Korea also has developed a small prototype submarine.
This was produced despite U.S. claims that South Korea did not need
a submarine force. Currently they lack the technical expertise to
enter full-scale production of modern submarines, but the production
of the prototype is a major technical breakthrough. Also, procuring
the submarine production over U.S. objections shows a growing
independence in the South Korean arms industry.
3. Air Force
South Korea and the United States currently coproduce the
Hughes 500-D in-country. They also produce most of the components
of the 36 F-5 E/F aircraft indigenously. Only the F-5 engines, and
a certain amount of airframe parts are fully coproduced. The U.S.
has supplied South Korea with full logistical support packages, all
production tooling, data, and training and technical assistance.
This will greatly improve South Korea's aircraft technology program,










South Korea successfully tested its first surface-to-surface
missile in September 1978. This was a missile entirely developed by
Korean technology. The solid fuel missile has a range of 100 to
160 Km which would allow it to hit any target in North Korea.
A second surface-to-surface missile has been developed by
South Korea which resembles a shortened version of the Honest John.
Little is known about its capabilities. 3oth new missiles were
publicly displayed in the 1979 military day parade.
South Korea has rapidly developed its indigenous arms produc-
tion industries. Although actual production did not begin until the
mid-seventies, they have expanded so quickly that South Korea is
almost self-sufficient in the production of ground weaponry and naval
units. The quality and quantity of South Korean arms improved rapidly
making them competitive in the arms market. Although South Korea is
dependent on advanced weaponry from the U.S., they have quickly moved
toward an independent arms industry.
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E. ARMS PRODUCTION COMPARISON
A comparison of the stages of development attained by each of the
Koreas can be made using their current arms production capabilities,
and Micheal Moodie's "Third World Defense Industry Development Model."
Moodie's model is used because it provides a logical comparative base
that is easy to follow. Moodie states that there are seven steps
through which a developing defense industry must progress:
First , maintenance and overhaul facilities are established
for repair and service of imported arms.
Second , indigenous assembly of weapons systems or equip-
ment under licenses with prefabricated kits assembled in
domestic plants.
Third , indigenous assembly continues, however, simple
components are locally manufactured, under license, while
more sophisticated components are imported.
Fourth , domestic production capabilities are increased to
allow complete systems production locally under license.
Fifth , domestic arms producers obtain the ability to make
modifications in systems produced under license. These
modifications may be extensive enough to allow the licensee
to claim that their modifications are sufficient enough to
void the licensing agreement and its controls.
Sixth
,
production of domestically designed and tested
systems is undertaken using only imported components
of more sophisticated technologies.
Seventh , domestically designed systems using no imported
components are produced. -"
Using this model, a comparison can be made between North and South
Korea as to their respective stages of development of arms production





North Korea is in the late stage of development in middle and
low technology items. They have the production capability to manu-
facture ground equipment without any imported parts; however, they
do use Soviet designs. These systems are simple designs using out-
dated Soviet technology. Although their equipment is not really up
to date, its simple maintenance and rugged design makes it better
suited for Third World Armies than newer, more complicated equipment.
North Korea is behind in high technology industrial develop-
ment. The problems of licensed production of the MIG-21's reflect
these deficiencies. Although north Korea received a license to
produce this aircraft in 1974, no indigenously produced aircraft
have been identified as of this date. 36 Similarly, there are no
known missile systems or electronic components produced in North
Korea. From available data, North Korea is somewhere between the
second and third levels on Moodie's model.
2. South Korea
South Korea has moved rapidly through the arms industry
development process. Their large economic base has allowed them to
reach the upper levels of industrialization in median and low tech-
nology weapons. Considering that South Korea produces all infantry
weapons and ammunition, they could be considered to be in the late
sixth or early seventh stage of arms industrialization. In low and
median technology systems production, South Korea has made great
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advances on closing the gap with North Korea. They actually have
passed North Korea in industrial development by designing their own
tanks and submarines, while North Korea still relies on Soviet designs.
South Korea's greatest arms production advantage lies in high
technology production. 3y developing an export-oriented economy,
South Korea developed a technically skilled labor force. Skills
developed in producing TV's and radios were readily transferable to
electronics used in military equipment. Similarly, skills developed
in the emerging auto industry were used to produce the Fiat 6614
amphibious infantry fighting vehicle. South Korea's indigenous
production of missiles, coproduction of aircraft, and development
of electronic systems indicates that they are moving from the late
middle stage of industrialization into the early final stage of
high technology production.
Actual comparison of the two countries arms production capabil-
ities shows that North Korea enjoys a slight lead in actual production
of low and middle technology production, with South Korea quickly
closing. However, South Korea has surpassed North Korea in industrial
development by designing its own low and middle technology equipment.
With South Korea's larger economic base and emerging steel industry,
they should outdistance North Korea in low and middle technology
arms production in the early 1980' s.
South Korea enjoys a substantial lead in high technology systems
production. This advantage was gained largely by the state organized
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Fine Instrument Center which supports development of electronic,
mechanical, and technical industries. This agency aids development
and conducts research in high technology areas for military and civil
industries. Although North Korea is advancing in the high technology
areas, the gap will continue to widen favoring South Korea.
F. EFFECTS OF ARMS DEVELOPMENT
The full effects of the emerging arms industries in the two Koreas
are only beginning to become apparent. Although both countries developed
their arms industries to satisfy their own security needs, by developing
these industries they removed cne of the tightest constraints to conflict—
their dependency on external sources for arms. Although the full
effect of the development of arms industries in North and South Korea
are not clear, it seems certain that the major powers have lost much
37
of their ability to influence events in Korea.
The ability of both Koreas to provide for their own defense require-
ments may not be as pessimistic as stated above. This will shift the
burden of maintaining military balance to the countries directly
involved. This will require both North and South Korea to carry a
larger portion of their defense requirements and grant the superpowers
more political and military options in Northeast Asia.
In this case, not only might pressure of regional conflict be
lessened, but the need for outside great power intervention, either
directly or through arms transfers, might be reduced. Although
presently it may be expedient for both Koreas to provide for more
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of their own security needs by developing their arms industries,
leverage will be lost for present expediency.
Evidence of the loss of leverage by the major powers already
has begun to appear in Korea. North Korea, for example, currently
is supplying arms and ammunition to Iran allowing them to fight the
Soviet supplied State of Iraq.
Donald Goldstein points out that great powers are more attuned to
total world order considerations, and are more likely to weigh
international security than Third World countries. The influx of
Third World arms may lead to longer military actions of greater
intensity than if both combatants were dependent on major powers
for arms.
Therefore, the net effect of the development of arms industries in
both Koreas has been an increase in their political and military
maneuverability. 3oth have increased their involvement in regional
and international affairs through the transfer of indigenously produced
arms. While increasing their freedom in the international arena, they
have reduced the major powers freedom by supplying arms to states that
formerly were dependent on major powers for arms transfers.
If both Koreas become more independent, due in part to arms produc-
tion, these trends should intensify. This probably will be more
damaging to the Soviet Union than to the United States because of the
more liberal arms transfer policy of the Soviet Union. Regardless of
its effects on major powers, the trends toward more independence on the
56

part of both Koreas is likely because of their growing capability to




IV. KOREAN MILITARY FORCES
In the previous chapters, the elements of military development were
studied. This established a base from which to examine the actual
development of the military forces of North and South Korea. This
chapter will show the patterns of force development that led to the
current military situation in the Korean Peninsula.
To determine the significance of the current situation in Korea,
a trend analysis will be conducted using the patterns of military
development. Since a year-by-year analysis of both military forces
would add little to the understanding of overall trends, this study
will examine developments over five-year intervals (wiien applicable),
and an overall trend when they provide more clear insights.
Charts showing the actual year-by-year changes are provided to
aid this analysis. The combination of these two will allow for a
complete trend analysis, and provide progress reports on the
modernization efforts of both military forces.
This study will consist of an analysis of military development
from 1965 to the present. The year 1965 was selected because that
was when north Korea began their modernization efforts. This period
also completely encompasses South Korea's modernization efforts which
began some five years later. To insure that the trend of military
development is perceived in the proper context, the mission of each
military force must be known; therefore, before beginning the military




Military objectives, while rather vague, normally provide a good
tool for studying developmental patterns. In the case of the two
Koreas, external influences are very prevalent in the wording of their
military objectives. The objectives are directly reflected in the
mission statements of the respective Armies, since the Army is the
dominant military unit in both countries.
1 . North Korea
The mission, or objective of the Korean People's Army was
defined in Article 100 of their Constitution. Article 100 was taken
almost verbatim from the Soviet Constitution and reads:
"In order to defend the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, the People's Army shall be
organized. The mission of the Korean People's
Army shall be to defend the independence of the
fatherland and the people's freedom. "2
The special relationship of the Army to the Government, parti-
cularly the Party, was defined by amendments 66, 67, and 68 in 1961.
These amendments established that:
"The Korean People's Army is the armed
force of the Korean Worker's Party; that the
Army Party Committee shall be organized, and
that it will belong directly to the Central
Committee. "3
It also develops links between the Party organization within
the Army, and the local Party organizations, which again follows the
Soviet example.
From these examples, a mission statement can be derived. The
primary mission of the Korean People's Army is to defend the
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Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the people's freedom.
Furthermore, it can be ascertained that direct control of the Army
lies in the hands of the highest political body, the Central Committee
of the Korean Worker's Party.
2. South Korea
The mission of the Republic of Korea's military was described
by former President Park to be:
"To ensure the success and realization in peace
of the Revitalizing Reforms of the Nation [this is
the program established by President Park's 1961
coup], to be the driving force for the advance of the
Korean people, and the restraining force against the
outbreak of another war and disorder. ... In order
to restrain and cope with any kind of enemy surprise
invasion (and obtain the final victory if this occurs)
immense combat strength should be maintained in
accordance with the strength-against-strength principle.
Thus the mission of the ROK Armed Forces is to be a deterrent
against invasion, with a secondary role of aiding economic development
during peacetime. Furthermore ROK Forces are to be sufficiently strong
to obtain a victory if attacked. Like North Korea, effective control
of the military is maintained at the highest levels of government.
B. PATTERNS OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENT
In studying the patterns of military development, care must be
taken to insure that undue emphasis is not given to numbers alone.
Many times a number such as total force levels may show one side
totally superior to the other, when in reality, both sides are equal.
This was the case in 1965 when South Korea had almost a two- to-one
advantage in total force strength.
60

In reality, both Koreas had 18 maneuver divisions of equal fire-
power. Likewise, other elements, both tangible and intangible, must
be considered in force comparison: terrain, morale, leadership,
firepower, training, and combat experience—just to name a few. So,
in considering military advantage, all available facts must be weighed
before ascertaining which side has the military advantage.
This study of the patterns of military development will begin with
a general study of total force levels from 1965 to the present. Then
a more specific study of the development by individual services will
be made. Again, caution should be used in making judgments about the
military balance in Korea from trend analyses. Although trend analyses
show the direction in which military capabilities are moving, they are
by no means the final factor.
1 . Total Force Comparisons
Using total forces as a measure of military strength, South
Korea held a substantial lead until the late 1 970* s (as shown in
Chart 1). South Korea had almost a two-to-one lead over North
Korea in 1965. The trends since then have reflected the stated
objectives of both countries. North Korea has been chipping away
at South Korea's lead. South Korea has maintained a relatively
3
constant, strong military force of over 600,000 men.
a. North Korea
Analyzing the trends in total force levels (.using four base
years--1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980) the changing indication perceived of














In 1965, North Korea had some 279,000 fewer men on active
duty than did South Korea. This had been the trend since the end of
the Korean War, because of the insecurity of both North and South
Korea due to relations with major allies, and their proximity to their
allies. However, the instability caused by differences with major
allies, and the Sino-Soviet split, caused North Korea to pursue an
independent course in the mid-sixties.
The increase in total forces shows North Korea's growing
independence. By 1970, North Korea had reduced South Korea's advantage
to 50,000 (to 226,000) men, and by 1975 by another 75,000 men (to
152,000). Continuing their drive for total force equality, and lower-
ing their draft age to 16, by 1978 North Korea was able to overtake
South Korea. Continued effort allowed North Korea to obtain a 75,000
q
man advantage in total force deployment by 1980.
b. South Korea
The South Korean's need for security is reflected also by
their force levels. Following the Korean War, South Korea maintained
this high force level; the level can be related directly to insecurity
following the Korean War.
In the early I960' s, under the leadership of President
Park, South Korea had begun a rapid economic development. This emerg-
ing economy (and strengthened military capabilities through massive
U.S. arms transfers) gave South Korea the confidence to accept the
increase in North Korea's total force strength without undue alarm.
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Continued economic growth, increased capabilities of ROK units, and
U.S. presence allowed South Korea to maintain relatively stable force
levels in spite of enormous gains by North Korea.
The current force levels in both North and South Korea
allows both countries to meet their military objective of "defense of
the homeland". Considering the force levels as a percentage of
population (5% for South Korea, and 12% for North Korea), continued
expansion is unlikely. In the past 20 years, South Korea has expanded
its total forces by only 20,000 to 40,000 men, while their population
has increased by 10 million. In the same period, North Korea has
increased their force by 325,000 men while their population has
12
expanded only five million.
The trend of total military expansion shows that South Korea
is unwilling to increase their force to the levels that would be
needed to invade North Korea. North Korea's continued expansion
efforts have allowed them to gain a slight advantage over South Korea
in total forces deployed. However, since 1979, when updated figures
indicated that North Korea held a military advantage, they have only
slightly increased their force levels. It is unlikely that any
drastic change in force levels will occur in the foreseeable future.
North Korea is unable to mobilize the required forces to invade the
south due to South Korea's population advantage. South Korea is
unwilling to commit resources required to obtain military superiority
needed to invade the North.
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2. Ground Force Comparison
The Army is the largest and most important part of the armed
forces in both Koreas. The amount of men and material allocated to
the ground forces, as compared to the other services, indicates their
13
relative importance.
Using the four areas shown on Chart 2 (Army Strength, Number
of Active Divisions, Number of Tanks, and the Number of Artillery),
a comparative analysis can be made of the development process in the
ground forces. The total active Army shows the potential numbers of
men that either country could muster without mobilizing reserves or
para-military units. The number of active divisions gives the best
indication of actual military preparedness. The number of tanks gives
a good indication of offensive capability, and the total artillery
provides information about supporting fire and defensive capability.
Again, as with total force levels, the information must be
carefully scrutinized remembering that North Korea generally overstates
14
their capabilities, and South Korea generally understates theirs.
a. North Korean Ground Forces
North Korea's ground forces are designed along the Soviet
model stressing shock and maneuver tactics for tneir armor and
mechanized infantry, and designed along the Chinese model for light
infantry. '5 Both the Soviet Union and China stress high firepower
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Their large number of maneuver battalions, and high unit
firepower structure reflects the external influence on the Korean
People's Army. Chart 2 shows the actual stress that North Korea
places on shock, maneuverability, and firepower. A further breakdown
by elements will show this even more clearly.
North Korea currently nas 35 light infantry divisions.
Each of these divisions are organized on the old style Soviet or
Chinese models. They are composed of 9,000 men which comprises
three infantry regiments of three battalions each, three artillery
battalions (each with 18 tubes of 7.62mm field howitzers, 122mm
medium guns, and 120mm mortars), an anti-tank battalion (with 24
37mm and four 14.5mm guns), an assault-gun battalion (with 18 100mm
SPG's), an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, a reconnaissance
company, and a chemical warfare company. Although the North Korean
division has 2,000 men less than the South Korean division, their
stress on high unit firepower allows each division to equal the
firepower of a South Korean division.
The development of large numbers of infantry divisions,
tanks, artillery, and mortars reflects North Korea's concern about
national security. Although the trends shown in Chart 2 indicate
a development of an offensive thrust, closer analysis denies this
concept. North Korea's 2,500 tanks are divided roughly into three
equal components: first there are two armored divisions; then five
armored regiments attached to corps echelons; and finally, there are
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42 companies and battalions assigned to infantry and motorized
divisions. The fact that North Korea has only about 600 tanks
assigned to armored divisions indicates that they would not be
used for offensive purposes. Likewise, many of North Korea's
heavy artillery pieces are in fixed Y-shaped bunkers facing the
DMZ. 18
Thus, North Korean ground forces, although offensive by
design, are deployed in a defensive mode, with their armor to the
rear, and their artillery sights fixed. All indications regarding
North Korea's expansion in ground forces point to an increased
emphasis on self-reliance. <Jith the growing belligerency between
their major allies, North Korea seems to have developed a ground
force capable of defending their homeland without external aid.
If the trends of military expansion continue in North Korea, South
Korea will counter with a massive military buildup.
Due to South Korea's population and GNP advantage, it
would be unlikely that North Korea would pursue such a goal. The
trend since the revaluation in 1978 indicates that North Korea has
halted their rapid expansion. The current ground level in North
Korea insures they will not be invaded by the South, wnile posing
only minimal threat to South Korean security,
b. South Korean Ground Forces
The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) is organized along the
old U.S. regimental model. This triangular structured army is well-
suited for fixed-place, attrition- type warfare. In South Korea's
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situation, this mode is well -suited for defense of the main attack
corridors. The rough terrain along the DMZ further aids South Korea's
defensive posture. The terrain denies the use of armor and mecnan-
ized units except in narrow corridors whicn have been heavily fortified,
South Korea's Army structure is designed for the deterrent role it
19
assumes.
The RQKA infantry has adopted the U.S. Army's objectives
of organizing the battlefield. This requires South Korean forces to
contain and channel advancing forces into areas where they can be
destroyed by concentrated artillery fire. South Korea has developed
a massive defensive line of fortified strongholds and tank traps to
20
accomplish their objective.
Statistics on South Korea's Army development are yery
misleading since they generally understate actual strength. The large
numbers of independent brigades and battalions allows much of their
equipment to go undetected. Also, the change in reporting systems
causes significant underestimation of actual strength during the
21
period 1966-1976, and probably in 1979-1980. (See Chart 2.)
The number of active divisions is also misleading.
Although South Korea has shown 18 to 24 active divisions since the
nid-sixties, they have had ten divisions in reserve. These reserve
divisions are assigned to the Second Army, and maintain a full cadre
at all times. The troops are reservists, however, they have frequent
22
training which maintains their combat readiness.
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Questions also can arise about the number of tanks and
artillery tubes in the South Korean inventory. The ROK Army received
421 M-48 tanks in 1978, and an undetermined number (over 200) in 1979
and 1980. However, the reported numbers are actually less than in
1977. Similarly, South Korea has been producing 155mm and 105mm
howitzers since the mid-seventies, but their reported inventory has
23increased only slightly.
A more realistic view of the trends would still show South
Korean forces trailing the North in firepower, but not nearly as much
as projected in the SIPRI reports used for this data. The IISS Mi 1 i tary
Balance shows the discrepancy and gives more details about the diffi-
culties in analyzing South Korean ground forces (See Table 16).
Although South Korea's Army is presumably inferior to that
of North Korea, it is quite capable of defending their country from
invasion. Considering the advantage of defense and terrain, South
Korea's ground forces have achieved their goal of defense of the homeland,
The trends of development of ground forces reflects both
countries' preoccupation with security concepts and political motives.
3oth Koreas need strong armies to defend against invasion, and to
insure internal stability. The rapid growth of North Korea's Army
reflects its efforts to assume independence from China and Russia.
Their current strength allows them to assume this role.
Conversely, South Korea has deemphasized military develop-
ment, or at least reported developments, to insure that U.S. troops
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are not withdrawn. This is not to say that South Korea has allowed
the North to gain a significant military advantage, nor that South
Korea has not provided their fair share of support. What it does
mean is that South Korea believes that it is in their best interest
to have American troops remain, and that a buildup comparable to
that of North Korea might jeopardize U.S. assistance. Trends show
that both Koreas have published the "facts" of the development of
their ground forces in accordance with political as well as security
objectives.
3. Naval Development
The Navy plays an important role in national defense for both
North and South Korea. This is particularly true of South Korea
whose lines of communication with major allies are via sea. The
development of the Navy of both countries shows the growing importance
of this military force, especially in the 1970's, for national security,
The naval forces of North and South Korea are structurally
different due to their assigned missions. North Korea has developed
a large fleet of torpedo boats and motor gun-boats to protect their
coastline and to infiltrate insurgents into South Korea.
Conversely, South Korea has developed a heavier Navy with
destroyers and frigates to protect their sea lines of communication.
Lately, South Korea has shifted emphasis to coastal defense, while
only slightly increasing their large ship force.
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a. North Korean Naval Development
North Korea has been yery consistent in their naval
development policy. They have emphasized small patrol boats and
submarine development. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, North
Korea greatly increased production of torpedo boats and motor gun-
boats. This increased production allowed them to expand from 60
torpedo boats and 30 patrol boats in 1969, to 165 torpedo boats,
134 fast-attack gun-boats, and 70 coastal missile patrol craft in
1980. In addition, the North Korean Navy has expanded from three
submarines in 1969, to 16 in 1980. 25
Corresponding with the increased systems capability is
the North Korean increase in naval manpower. In 1965, the North
Korean Navy consisted of 8,800 men. By 1975, this number had doubled
to 17,000 men, and in the following five years, it almost doubled
again— up to 31,000 men in 1980. Although the number of combat ships
seem to have increased faster than the manpower, they actually are
equal because of the small number of personnel required to man the
fast patrol boats where the major North Korean vessel expansion has
occured.
b. South Korea's flaval Development
Although South Korea seemingly has fallen significantly
behind the North in naval developments, these figures are deceiving.
South Korea has emphasized large ship deployment increasing their
number of destroyers from one in 1965, to seven in 1975, and 10 in
27
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With the expansion in large ships, there was a need to increase
drastically the number of personnel in the Navy. This increase is
shown in Chart 3.
Recently South Korea has initiated effort to improve
their coastal defense forces. They currently are producing the
28
PSSM-5 fast patrol boat which has significantly aided in this area.
Also, South Korea recently completed the world's largest shipworks
29
which will undoubtedly speed South Korea's naval development.
Trends in both navies, as shown in Chart 3, are toward
strong self-sufficient forces. Both Koreas have highly developed
ship production works which have aided in the development of these
forces. The development of each Navy reflects concerted efforts to
achieve goals set by their respective Governments. The naval trends
clearly show that both Koreas are willing to place large amounts of
resources into needed defense areas if their security is threatened.
4. Air Force Development
The Air Forces of both North and South Korea are designed
to protect their homeland from attack, and to support their ground
missions. Chart 4 shows the changes in Air Force personnel, fighter
aircraft, and transport/trainer aircraft since 1965.
a. North Korea
North Korea has maintained a numertcal superiority in
aircraft since the end of the Korean War. However, this superiority










SOURCE: The Military Balance
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The trends show North Korea expanding their Air Force
personnel, and transport/trainer aircraft, while combat aircraft
31
have remained relatively stable at 600. What the trends fail to
show is the quality of North Korea's air assets. In 1965, the
North Korean Air Force was composed of 500 MIG-15's, MIG-17's, and
11-28 aircraft. By 1970, the MIG-21 had replaced the MIG-15's and
MIG-17's as the first line interceptor. Since 1970, North Korea
has increased the number of MIG-21' s from 60 to 120, but it is still
their most modern interceptor. The bulk of North Korea's combat
aircraft is still MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's.
32
The most drastic change in North Korea's Air Force has
occurred in transport aircraft. The largest single change has been
in the An-2 transport aircraft (40 in 1970 to 200 in 1980). Although
this is an old design aircraft, it is well -suited for infiltrating
troops into South Korea, and to resupply them. Due to the extremely
small radar return of the An-2, and North Korea's large number of
guerrilla warfare units, the An-2 is the most feared aircraft in the
33
North Korean inventory.
b. South Korean Air Force
South Korea's Air Force has improved both in quality and
quantity in the past 15 years. In 1965 it was composed almost
entirely of F-86 aircraft. Beginning in the early 1970's, the F-86
aircraft were being replaced by more modern F-5's. By 1975, the F-5
was the mainstay of South Korea's tactical airforce, and by 1973,
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only 50 F-36's remained in active service. South Korea's qualitative
edge was greatly enhanced in 1971 when the F-4 was added to their
inventory.
South Korea's efforts in developing their Air Force have
been rewarded. With their current inventory of 60 F-4's, and 220
F-5 aircraft, their Air Force far outclasses that of the North. While
they are numerically inferior, they have better air-to-ground delivery
capability, better penetrating capability, large payloads, and far
35
better air intercept capability.
The Air Forces of both North and South Korea have accomplished
their missions of protecting their homeland. While North Korea has
enjoyed a numerical edge, the Air Force capability advantage has
shifted to the South. Both Koreas have placed a lot of emphasis on
developing an effective transport system (see Chart 4). With the
exception of the An-2's in North Korea, and the F-4's in South Korea,
there has been no threatening developments in either Air Force.
C, CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION
Having examined the development of the military forces of both
Koreas, we come to the all important question: What is the current
military situation on the Korean Peninsula? An excellent source to
ascertain the answer can be found in The Mil itary Balance
,
published
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
Data from this source are presented in Table 7, "Comparison of Ground,




COMPARISON OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES, 1930
Component North Korea South Korea
Active duty personnel 678,000 600,600
Active Army 600,000 520,000
Infantry Divisions 35 20
Motorized Infantry Divisions 3 1
Armor 2 (1)
Separate Infantry Brigades 4 2
Separate Armor Brigades 4 2
Light Infantry brigades 8
Parami 1 i tary/Mi 1 i ti a 2,500,000 2 ,800,000
Reserve Forces 338,000 1 ,240,000
Medium Tanks 2,500 360
Light/Amphibious Tanks 150
APC's 1,000 570
Field Artillery 4,000 2,000
MRL's 1,900 NA
Mortars 9,000 5,300
Anti-Tank Weapons 1,500 180 + TOW
AAA 5,000 106
SAM Sites 45 125
Naval Forces
Personnel 31 ,000 43,000
Bases 18 8
Combat Ships 400-425 110
Patrol Boats







Combat Aircraft 615 362
Fighter Aircraft, SU-7 20 F-4 60
MIG-21 120 F-5 220





SOURCE: The Military Balance
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By comparing forces listed in Table 7, areas with major differences
can be extracted:
TABLE 3
MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES, 1980
Component North Korea South Korea
Infantry Divisions 35 20
Reserve Forces 338,000 1,240,000
Tanks 2,500 860
Field Artillery 4,000 2,000
MRL's 1,900 N/A
Mortars 9,000 5,300
Combat Ships 400-425 no
Combat Aircraft 615 362
SOURCE: Extracted from Table 7
Since these are the areas having the greatest difference, by com-
paring and discussing these items an overall force comparison can be
made. Although the differences in the numbers of active duty divisions
strongly favors the North, it is largely offset by South Korea's
reserve program. North Korea currently has 16 more active infantry
divisions than does the South. However, South Korea has the cadre
for eight divisions assigned to the Second Corps, and reserve personnel
assigned to them for quick recall and mobilization. The remainder of
North Korea's ground force personnel advantage is more than nullified
by South Korea's 1,100,000 ready-reserve force compared to 260,000 for
North Korea.
North Korea has a large advantage in armor and armored personnel
carriers. However, the useful Iness of these weapons is severely
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limited by Korea's rough terrain and the limited corridors of attack.
Both North and South Korea have turned these attack corridors into
"mini-Maginot Lines". 38 Prepared defensive systems are designed to
halt armored advance, and channel them into areas where they can be
destroyed by artillery and anti-tank fire. Thus, the armor advantage
of North Korea adds little to their offensive threat, but greatly to
their defensive capability. With the current positioning of armored
units behind advanced infantry units, North Korea quickly can advance
armored units to the point of attack if their advanced forces are
attacked. Conversely, with their armor positioned behind their
infantry units, they have limited offensive usefulness.
The most critical imbalance between the Korean forces is in
artillery (4,000 to 2,000). North Korea's artillery also is qualita-
tively superior because of range advantage over that of South Korea.
The only long-range artillery in the South are the twelve self-
propelled 175mm guns. Adding to North Korea's numerical and range
superiority are highly protected firing emplacements excavated into
the mountains facing the DMZ. Since both Koreas rely heavily on
artillery, North Korean advantage here could be considered a grave threat
to the South.
40
In addition to superior artillery firepower, North Korea enjoys a
definite advantage in mortars and multiple rocket launchers (9,000
to 5,300, and 1,900 to zero, respectively). These weapons are
excellent against massed infantry and for area denial. Although North
30

Korea still has a marked superiority in these weapons, South Korea
has cut this advantage by indigenously producing mortar and MRL's.
South Korea defensive positioning negates much of the firepower
advantage gain by the area weapons.
The number and size of ships in each Navy reflect their mission.
South Korea's Navy consists largely of destroyer-sized ships used
for sea control, whereas the Navy of North Korea is mostly composed
of coastal patrol boats and 15 submarines. Each Navy is capable of
accomplishing its mission while posing little real threat to the
other. 42
The last major area to consider is the Air Force. The North
Korean Atr Force is composed of fighters, fighter-bombers, and bomber
aircraft. The bulk of these consist of MIG-15, -17, and -19 aircraft
which are obsolete in today's air combat environment. Only the 20
SU-7's, and the 120 MIG-21's can be considered modern aircraft.
Although North Korea's Air Force is antiquated, it fills its mission
of strategic and tactical defense yery well.
Although South Korea's Air Force is numerically inferior to that
of the North, it is qualitatively superior. South Korea's 60 F-4
fighter-bombers are the most advanced aircraft in the two Koreas.
Not only is it superior to any fighter aircraft in North Korea, but
it has almost seven times the payload capability of the 11-28
bombers. Also, the 200 F-5 fighter aircraft are comparable or
superior to North Korea's MIG-21's. North Korea's numerical advantage
loses much of its sting when the actual capabilities are compared. 44
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Supplementing South Korea's Air Force are United States Air
Forces in Korea (USAFK). Although the USAFK is not part of the ROK
forces, it is perhaps the greatest deterrent to war in Korea. The
USAFK are armed with F-4 aircraft capable of delivering nuclear
weapons.^ Thus, the USAFK is a vital part of South Korean deterrence.
If only the tangible assets of the Korean military forces are
compared, North Korea would have a clear advantage. But, in consider-
ing true capabilities, some intangible factors must be considered.
The South Korean population living standard has greatly improved
over the past 20 years thereby making an insurgent movement impossible.
South Korea's military leaders are highly trained, both in Korean
academies and U.S. schools. The ROK forces are highly motivated and
well -trained. They have combat experience from Vietnam. And, although
there is no material value placed on national pride and defense of the
homeland, they would weigh heavily if South Korea were to be attacked.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Viewing the whole picture, the Korean Peninsula is probably the
most mobilized area in the world. North Korea has the world's fifth
largest Army, and South Korea's is the sixth. Both countries have
large reserve forces and para-military forces further adding to the
military preparedness of both states.
From the study of the military forces of both North and South Korea,
I have determined that both are capable of defending their nations
against attack by the other. Additionally, at the present time,
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neither has the required strength to attack and defeat the other
without outside help. To obtain this leverage, one side would have
to pursue a massive and prolonged buildup without the other side
taking action to correct the growing imbalance. This imbalance is




V. ECONOMIC EFFECT OF DEFENSE SPENDING
In recent years, research concerning the effect of defense spending
on economic growth has increased. These studies have arrived at some-
what mixed results. Until recently it was felt that the economic
impact of defense spending should be negative because of the diversion
of resources away from highly productive sectors of the economy. How-
ever, a new school of thought, originating with the Emile Benoit study
showing that defense spending does not necessarily have a negative
impact on economic growth in developing countries, has gone so far as
to argue that defense expenditures might, in fact, stimulate growth."'
In the last few years, however, a number of studies have arrived at
2
somewhat mixed conclusions depending on the economy studied.
In this chapter, an examination of the effects of military spending
on economic growth in North and South Korea will be made. It draws on
a model developed by Professors Looney and Frederiksen who hypothesized
that developing countries facing financial constraints cannot simul-
taneously afford the levels of expenditures necessary for high growth
and maintenance of high defense expenditures. Under these conditions,
defense expenditures would most likely have a negative impact on
economic growth. On the other hand, countries that have realtively
abundant financial resources should experience a positive relationship
between defense spending and economic growth.
34

Although North and South Korea have structurally different economies
there is no reason to believe that the same set of financial con-
straints do not apply for each. The model developed by Looney and
Fredricksen primarily used studies of capitalist economies, however,
Yugoslavia, a socialist state, fit in nicely. For this reason, the
Looney and Fredricksen model will be used to determine the effect of
defense expenditures on the economies of North and South Korea.
A. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Both Koreas are currently pursuing programs of strong economic
growth. Apparently these programs are a continuation of economic
competition that started in 1945 when Korea was partitioned at the
38th parallel, and then intensified in the 50' s and 60' s. 4
TABLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES AT PARTITION, 1945
















SOURCE: CIA, Korea: The Economic Race Between the North and
the South, 1978.
North Korea gained the initial economic advantage by inheriting
the bulk of the Peninsula's minerals, hydroelectric resources, and
most of the heavy industrial base. North Korea also received a
slightly larger land area, and only one- third of Korea's total
35

population. In the partition, South Korea received most of the
Peninsula's limited agricultural resources, a large pool of
unskilled labor, and the larger share of light industry. From
this it is quite apparent that North Korea received the better
5
economic situation in the division of the Korean Peninsula.
1 . North Korea
The North Korean economy is based on the Marxist-Leninist
economic model. Since both North and South Korea have been developed
as "showplaces" for the Communist system and the Capitalist system
respectively, the success or failure of the North Korean economy will
have obvious ideological implications.
Being one of the most secretive nations in the world, yery
little is known about the North Korean economy. Economic statistics,
particularly those that might embarrass the government, are prime
objects for the secret stamp. Furthermore, the few statistics
issued by North Korea appear to have been carefully selected for
propaganda purposes, and are believed to present an exaggerated
picture of economic performance. As a result, some general trends
can be perceived, but it is impossible for one outside of the
North Korean establishment to obtain a complete and detailed
picture of the state of their economy.
a. Reconstruction, War, and Reconstruction
Between 1945 and 1950, North Korea's GNP more than
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This rapid growth was accomplished by significant Soviet aid to stimu-
late the North Korean economy. The Soviet Union granted North Korea
$40 million in economic aid between 1949 and 1951.
The Korean War interrupted North Korea's economic recovery
program. When the tide of battle turned against North Korea, and
their homeland was invaded, much of their economic infrastructure was
gdestroyed. The damage of the Korean War was estimated to be $3 billion
to the North Korean economy. Gross Industrial Product was 36 percent
lower after the war than in 1949. Other sectors of tne economy— steel
,
chemical, coal, electric, and fisheries— suffered even worse losses
which varied between 60 and 90 percent. This left North Korea
with the task of performing a total economic reconstruction program
again.
North Korea's wartorn economy was aided greatly in postwar
reconstruction by massive economic assistance from the Socialist bloc.
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During the Three-Year Economic Plan (1953-1956), North Korea received
over $900 million in grants and aid from the Soviet Union, China, and
the East European countries. North Korea made significant economic
progress in these years, laying the foundation for future economic
development. They claimed recovery efforts had been so successful
that their goals for the Three-Year Plan were fulfilled in two years
12
and eight months.
Pyongyang launched its first Five-Year Plan in 1957, to
"further consolidate the economic foundation of socialism and to
meet the main needs of the people for food, clothing, and housing."
However, as the economic conditions in North Korea improved, economic
aid was reduced from 33.4 percent of the state's revenues in 1954,
14
to 4.5 percent in 1958. Although economic aid was cut drastically,
North Korea had sufficient economic momentum to complete their Five-
Year Plan a year ahead of schedule, with an average annual growth rate
15
of 21 percent.
Between 1945 and 1960, with the exception of the war years,
the overall trends of economic growth in North Korea were quite impres-
sive. There are several reasons for this rapid growth following the
Korean War: a technical base already was established, foreign aid
was readily available, and the economy was reestablished using modern
technology. It should be noted, however, that the small initial base
from which the economy began presents a somewhat exaggerated picture
of the early growth performance in the 1950' s.
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b. Chuch'e: Self-Reliant Economy, 1960-1979
Since entering the 1960's, the pace of economic growth has
decreased drastically as measured by national income. The average
annual growth rate between 1961-67 was 8.9 percent as compared to the
two previous plans (1954-56, and 1957-1960) where growth averaged 26
and 21 percent respectively. The fact that no mention of the status
of national income was made in Kim Il-sung's 1970 speech to the Fifth
Party Congress suggests that their target of raising national income
1
8
by 2.7 times was not fulfilled.
CHART 5
NORTH KOREAN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1960-1980
SOURCE: Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbooks.
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north Korea's poor economic performance continued into the
1970* s with a less than successful Six-Year Plan (1971-76). Although
Pyongyang claimed an annual growth rate of 16 percent in industrial
production, an increase in grain production to 8.5 million tons in 1977,
and a 70-80 percent standard of living increase, these claims seem to
19
have been exaggerated. In fact, some annual targets announced for
completion in the present economic plan— including 56,000-60,000 mega-
watt hours of electricity generation, 70-80 million tons of coal
production, 8 million tons of steel production, and 5 million tons of
chemical fertilizer— are equal to, or below, those announced for
1976.
20
While North Korea gradually has increased its GMP and
per capita GNP over the past two decades, performance still has fallen
short of the government's targets. For a planned economy, like that
of North Korea, economic performance must be judged in terms of its
own expectations as well as the objective norms of economic growth,
ilorth Korea's economic performance during the 1960's and 1970* s failed
on both counts, although for somewhat different reasons in the early
and latter years. Outstanding economic performance in the 1950's
resulted in setting unreal istically high targets for the 1960's. Poor
performance in the 1970's stems from poor economic planning. In the
early 1970's, North Korean planners felt it was possible to stimulate
economic growth by massive imports of technology. They vastly under-
estimated the importance of establishing a modern infrastructure
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to support these technological inputs. As a result, infrastructure
bottlenecks created by low levels of investment in this area caused
the economic plan for the 1970' s to fail miserably.
Although North Korea has been plagued with economic set-
backs, recent events indicate that the country is approaching the
1980' s with a more pragmatic view. Increasing exports were given top
22
priority in Kim II -sung 's 1980 New Year's address. The government's
growing concern over the countries' large balance of payments deficit
($2 billion) suggests that North Korea is becoming more aware of its
dubious standing in the world economic community. By renegotiating
their outstanding debts with Japan in 1979, North Korea gained time
23
needed to alleviate their growth-inhibiting infrastructure bottlenecks.
2. South Korea
South Korea has an export-oriented economic system based on
the Japanese model. Ever since the early 1960's, when President Park
Chung Hee assumed control of the government, South Korea has experienced
rapid economic modernization transforming them from one of the most
24backward countries in Asia to one of the most advanced.
a. Chaos and Survival, 1945-1961
The sixteen years between the end of VJorld War II and the
military coup d'etat was marred by political turmoil and economic stag-
nation. Following World War II, a United States Military Governmeat
was established to replace the ruling Japanese government. Under
Japanese rule, all major aspects of the economy were controlled by
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Japanese managers. With their departure, control was assumed by the
U.S. Military Government. The loss of effectiveness due to the
25
reorganization was not regained until 1947.
The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was founded in 1943.
Syngman Rhee was elected President because of his great popularity based
on his long service in the independence movement rather than upon his
abilities. The first two years under Rhee were, however, years of
substantial progress with electric power output increasing by 33 percent,
and industrial production by 50 percent. The Korean War, however, wiped
* *u -26out these gains.
Although progress was made under the U.S. Military Govern-
ment and the First Republic of Rhee, the desperate circumstances in
which the mass of the South Korean people found themselves following
World War II made survival the primary goal. Rice production fell
drastically in South Korea because of the lack of fertilizer. Under
Japanese rule, fertilizer was produced in North Korea and shipped to
the South. With the division of the Peninsula, fertilizer shipments
ended. Mass starvation in South Korea was prevented by large quan-
27
tities of wheat supplied by the United States.
Following the Korean War, Syngman Rhee's policies became increas-
ingly inept. Rhee's "Caesaristic" tendency emphasized personal power,
extreme nationalism, and anti -communism, while neglecting the more
mundane but essential task of institutionalization. Cabinet instabil-
ity and excessive centralization made concerted attention to develop-
ment impossible. To illustrate: Cabinet Ministers' tenure averaged
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only eleven months during Rhee's twelve-year administration. At one
time, Rhee himself had to approve all allocations of foreign exchange
above $500. Practically none of the administrators were experienced
28
in national planning.
The Rhee Government was overthrown by a massive uprising
in April 1960. It was replaced by the short-lived Second Republic of
Chang Myon. The Chang regime was characterized by excessive idealism
and commitment to civil liberties. Due to perpetual chaos and insta-
bility, the Second Republic was ended in a coup d'etat led by Major
29
General Park Chung Hee.
Although South Korea was able to achieve nominal economic
growth (five percent per year) it entered the 1960's with a per capita
income level of less than $100--one of the lowest in the world.
Additionally, imports were ten times higher than exports; inflation
was rampant; productivity was low; natural resources were underdevel-
oped; illiteracy was high; and agriculture was the primary sector of
the economy. In short, South Korea was an over-populated and extremely
poor country. Few countries in the world suffered such austere pros-
pects for rapid and sustained economic development as did South Korea
in I960. 30
b. South Korea's Economic Miracle, 1962-1979
The assassination of President Park Chung Hee on 26 October
1978 seems to have brought to a tragic end an eighteen-year era of
economic growth unmatched by any non-OPEC economy in the Third World.




11 percent with a per capita growth rate of 8.5 percent. Tne trans-
formation of South Korea from a backward nation to one of the most
modern in Asia can be considered to be a miracle.
The actual growth of the South Korean economy is shown in
Chart 6. In the five years prior to the first economic plan, the
South Korean economy grew at an annual rate of approximately five per-
cent. This was comparable to the world economic growth rate during tne
same period. Economic growth increased to 7.3 percent during the first
Five-Year Plan, while the world average remained about five percent.
CHART 6
SOUTH KOREAN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT GROWTH RATE, 1960-1979
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Continued export expansion and rapid industrialization accelerated
the growth rate to 10.5 percent during the second plan (1966-1971).
However, the most impressive performance came during the third Five-
Year Plan when South Korea's economy averaged an 11.2 percent growth
rate while most developing countries' economies were devastated by
international monetary instability and a worldwide recession caused
3?
by the 1973 oil embargo.
The assassination of President Park and the political
turmoil that followed had serious effects on the South Korean
economy. In 1980, South Korea's GNP fell by 5.7 percent. This is
the first no-growth year since President Park assumed control in
33
1961. However, timely economic adjustments, led by the devaluation
of the won , expansion of a high quality labor force (3 percent per
annum), and the ability to increase productivity by importing advanced
technology provide South Korea with an average growth potential of
34
7-8 percent during the 1980' s.
South Korea's sustained economic growth since the
initiation of the first Five-Year Plan in 1961 has allowed their
economy to develop to a point where economic growth almost can be
sustained internally.
B. DEFENSE SPENDING
Both Koreas have invested heavily in their defense. Table 11




NORTH-SOUTH COMPARATIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES , 1952-1979
North Korea So uth Korea
Year Total Exp % GNP % Nat Bud Total Exp % GNP % Nat Bud
1952 N/A* N/A N/A 67 N/A N/A
1953 75.4 N/A 15.2 154 5.7 10.1
1954 58.4 N/A 8.0 185 6.6 11.5
1955 61.3 N/A 6.2 151 5.1 10.9
1956 56.4 N/A 5.9 145 4.7 11.4
1957 54.2 N/A 5.3 146 5.8 13.7
1958 56.8 N/A 4.8 172 6.2 14.3
1959 61.0 N/A 3.7 180 6.4 15.8
1960 61.0 N/A 3.1 178 6.1 15.7
1961 275 N/A 2.6 185 5.7 19.2
1962 305 N/A 2.6 213 5.9 25.3
1963 280 12.2 1.9 177 4.2 14.9
1964 300 12.0 5.8 167 3.6 10.7
1965 350 14.0 10.1 175 3.7 11.6
1966 350 12.1 12.5 214 4.0 13.7
1967 470 15.7 30.4 233 4.1 14.2
1968 610 17.4 32.4 281 4.2 16.4
1969 615 15.4 31.0 324 4.1 17.8
1970 700 15.0 31.0 334 3.9 17.0
1971 911 17.1 34.1 394 4.3 17.3
1972 584 13.8 17.0 443 4.4 18.2
1973 630 14.0 15.4 470 3.9 13.3
1974 765 15.8 16.1 601 3.2 15.6
1975 950 16.3 16.4 730 3.3 13.0
1976 1030 11.2 16.7 1460 6.2 19.5
1977 1060 10.5 16.6 2033 6.6 19.1
1978 1230 11.4 16(+) 2586 5.6 19(est)
1979 1231 N/A N/A 3219 6.4(est) N/A
1980 4470(es t) NA N/A
*Not Available
SOURCE: The Military Balance
Table 11 reveals that since 1963, North Korea has committed over 10
percent of its GNP to defense expenditures, whereas, in the same period
South Korea has committed a relatively small portion (3-6 percent) of
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GriP to defense expenditures. Although the burden of military expend-
itures has fallen more heavily on North Korea, they have demonstrated
a willingness to continue investing a large amount of men and money
for defense.
1 . North Korea
The effect of military spending on economic growth becomes
apparent when a comparison is made between economic growth during that
period. Between 1957 and 1960, the North Korean annual economic growth
rate was 21 percent, while defense comprised only 3.1 to 6.3 percent
of the national budget, depending upon the year. As defense spending
took a larger part of the national budget, economic growth slowed.
(See Table 12.)
TABLE 12
NORTH KOREAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1957-1970*
Years
"""
Annual Economic Growth Rate Defense as Percentage
of National Budget




*Time frame coincides with North Korean Economic Plans.
SOURCE: The Military Balance ; Chong-Sik Lee, "New Patns for North
Korea," Problems of Communism , 1977, p. 56; Zagoria and Kim, North Korea
and the Major Powers
, p. 1056.
Mile not conclusive, there are strong indications that economic growth




Although defense spending continues to account for a large
proportion of South Korea's national budget, economic growth does
not seem to have been adversely affected. Economic growth since 1966
has averaged over ten percent annually, while defense spending has
accounted for over 15 percent of the national budget, and almost five
percent of the GNP. (See Table 13.)
TABLE 13
SOUTH KOREAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1961-1976*





*Time frame coincides with South Korean Economic Plans.
SOURCE: Handbook of Korea
It is apparent that North Korea's economy is more adversely
affected by military spending than that of the South. A logical
explanation for this phenomenon was presented in a study by Profes-
sors Looney and Frederiksen at the Naval Postgraduate School. In the
following section their model of Financial Resource Constraints will
be used to examine this issue.
C, RESOURCE CONSTRAINT THEORY
1 . Financial Constraints
In their study, Professors Looney and Frederiksen propose that
the effects of defense spending on economic growth in developing
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countries are a direct function of the economic flexibility and the
financial resource constraints they face. They arrived at this con-
clusion by performing a cluster analysis on 44 countries, grouping
them on the basis of a set of variables depicting resource constraints
and economic flexibility (i.e., diversification of exports, low debt
service). Four distinct groups were identified.
Group I consisted of 24 countries which were relatively flexible
and also had a relative abundance of financial resources. Group II
consisted of nine countries that had relatively inflexible exports
and high resource constraints. Group III consisted of three countries
with resource constraints somewhere between Groups I and II in that
by some measures they were unconstrained while at the same time
inflexible. Group IV consisted solely of Vietnam and was omitted
because of the dubious nature of its data and the extreme values of
its indicators.
Causal inference was proven for Groups I and II using linear
regression equations. In this study, economic growth was the depend-
ent variable. The investment rate, aid, and defense expenditures
were the independent variables. The coefficient of the defense variable
was positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent level for
Group I, and negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent
level for Group II. Apparently defense expenditures play a positive
role in countries with flexible economies and abundant financial
resources, and have a negative impact on growth in countries with
inflexible economies and financial constraints.
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Using this model, a comparison can be made between North and
South Korea as to the effect of defense expenditures on economic growth.
a. Application to North Korea
Having studied North Korean economic performance, and see-
ing the effects of defense spending, it would be expected that North
Korea would be a Group II country. According to the Looney and Fred-
riksen study, North Korea should have a negative relationship because
it is characterized by:
(1) A high population growth requiring increased amounts
of public services. The average growth rate of North Korea's popula-
tion between 1969 and 1978 was 2.8 percent annually. Due to this
growth rate, 45 percent of the present population is under 15 years
of age. 38
(2) Migration toward cities due to rising aspirations.
(3) An urban-industrial society which needs substantially
more infrastructure than previously due to urbanization and industrial-
ization.
(4) High urbanization rates requiring more government
attention to the construction of low income housing, urban transpor-
tation, etc. These investments have a high capital -output ration.
There has been forced migration to the cities increasing the demand
for housing and public services, thus North Korea's plans for the
1980's include massive construction of low-cost housing.
100

(5) Exports that are limited in number and are comprised
largely of products whose markets are expanding relatively slowly.
As a result, there is inelasticity and instability in the country's
external purchasing power. North Korea is limited in its exports,
42
primarily exports of coal, steel, and raw materials.
(6) Shortages of government revenue which create bottle-
necks in the supply of social overhead capital and skilled labor.
Bottlenecks in the infrastructure, particularly in transportation,
arose because of the imbalance in industrial development.
(7) Little or no capacity for the home production of
manufactured products, especially engineering products. Thus manu-
factures amount to a significant proportion of imports. North Korea
imports almost all finished goods, while exporting semi -finished
goods or raw materials.
(3) Chronic balance of payments difficulties due to
limited exports and little capability for home production, with the
result of direct import controls. Such controls on imports implies
reducing imports to the size of export receipts, which in turn,
45
creates shortages, bottlenecks, and reduced growth.
(9) A large external debt which has been built up as a
result of past government deficits and balance of payments deficits.
Additional borrowing is becoming increasingly difficult, thus
reducing the size of the current account deficit. North Korea has





(10) Reduced aid flows stemming from political and economic
frictions with its donor countries. Political differences with major
47
allies has reduced the aid received by North Korea.
North Korea's economy has the major characteristic of a
resource constrained country. From these examples and the effects of
military spending on economic growth (shown in Table 12), it can be
concluded that North Korean economic growth is adversely affected by
military spending.
b. Application to South Korea
South Korea was one of the countries used by professors
Looney and Frederiksen in their original study. It proved South Korea
to be one of the strongest economies in the group. (Group I, Table 14)




AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH, SOUTH KOREA, 1950-1965
Area South Korea Mean
Public Savings ( % GNP) 18.9 16.8
Government Savings ($ Revenue) 10.8 10.9
Aid {% GDP) 7.88 3.31
Defense Expenditures ( % GDP) 5.32 4.09
Investment (2GDP) 13.17 17.48
GDP (Growth Rate) 5.66 5.77
Defense Expenditures ($ annual change) -2.50 6.29
Civilian GDP (Growth Rate) 6.23 5.86
Import (Growth Rate) 20.9 9.1
Investment (Growth Rate) 17.1 10.6
SOURCE: Frederiksen and Looney, Military Spending and Economic




The growth of imports at 20.9 percent annually shows that
countries have confidence in the South Korean economy, while the
investment growth at 17.1 percent annually shows that the imports are
being used as a subsi stance base for its people. Although the data
used in the initial study only included input through 1965, the
current economy of South Korea has even less financial constraints
48
than it did in the period used in this model.
The major financial constraints on the South Korean
economy have proven to be caused by political instability, not by
military spending. During the period of political unrest following
the assassination of President Park, limited financial constraints
occurred because international banks were afraid to invest because
of the chaos in the Korean Government. However, South Korea has
sufficient compressibility in its economic system to absorb even
major shocks of short duration (i.e., short-term political instability
or rapid movement of capital to defense) without seriously damaging
49
the long-term growth of the economy.
2. Manpower Constraints
The impact of increasing military defense exceeds those
constraints imposed by financial limitations. By expanding the
military, countries also are affected by the labor drain. Naturally,
the more a country has of a given resource, the less painful will be
the effect of increasing its usage. To realize the total impact of
defense spending on economic growth, the human resource factor also




have the fifth and sixth largest standing armies in the world, despite
their relatively small sizes emphasizes the need to consider the human
resource constraint in light of military expansion and economic growth.
a. Application to North Korea
North Korea is surpassed only by Israel in the percentage
of its population committed to military duty. Currently, 678,000 men
(12 percent of the working-age males) are serving in the armed forces. ^
Considering that another 45 percent of North Korea's 17.9 million
people are under fifteen years of age, this creates a large manpower
52
drain. Common sense indicates that this would adversely affect
economic growth. No doubt the emphasis placed on military expansion
in the 1970' s slowed the development of a skilled work force needed
to operate advanced technological equipment.
b. Application to South Korea
South Korea has more than twice the population of North
Korea (38.2 million), yet it maintains a slightly smaller standing
army of 600,600 men. Only six percent of South Korea's working-age
males are on active military duty, which gives them a large compara-
53
tive advantage in available manpower. Likewise, the South Korean
military is used for public works which aids in economic infrastruc-
ture development. Thus, the number of men committed to South Korea's




North Korea had a clear economic advantage between 1945 and 1960
because of its ability to mobilize their work forces rapidly, and
because of massive aid. However, as the excess labor resources were
depleted, North Korea's economic growth began to dwindle, giving way
to a more dynamic South Korean economy. Indications are that socia-
list economic systems, like that of North Korea, do not provide
sufficient incentives for workers to increase their productivity
levels. Thus, when workers can no longer be transferred from
agriculture to industry, growth rates stagnate. This seems to have
happened to North Korea during the sixties and seventies. Although
North Korea remains one of the most socialized countries in the world,
indications are that more incentives are being given to increase
productivity.
After a slow start in the forties and fifties, South Korea's
export-oriented economy clearly outpaced the North Korean economy
in the sixties and seventies. This was accomplished by raising
labor productivity, absorbing modern technology, and increasing
their international financial status. Sustained economic performance
allowed South Korea to surpass the North in per capita GNP, an
advantage which Pyongyang had held since the partition in 1945, even
though the South had over twice the population. More importantly,
all indications are that the economic gap will widen substantially
in South Korea's favor during the next ten years.
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Another finding in this study is that North Korea's economy is
adversely affected by military spending, while it has had some
positive effects on the South Korean economy. Financial constraints
caused by poor economic performance and cuts in aid by China and
Russia, have forced North Korea to sacrifice economic growth to main-
tain defense expenditures. Conversely, South Korea has been able
to maintain high economic growth and military spending because they
enjoy a relative abundance of financial resources.
CHART 7
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SOURCE: Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbooks
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A corollary finding is that the comparative cost of maintaining
a large military force is higher for North Korea than for South
Korea. South Korea's larger population allows them to maintain
relative parity with North Korea while using only six percent of its
total male work force as compared to twelve percent for the North.
Finally, both Koreas have ambitious economic plans for the 1980's
If North Korea wishes to attain its economic goals, resources will
have to be shifted from the military to the civilian sector of the
economy. On the other hand, defense spending has relatively little
adverse effect on the growth of South Korea's economy. They are in





There is good reason to be optimistic about the prospects for peace
on the Korean Peninsula. Although it is doubtful that the major prob-
lems between the two Koreas will be settled in the near future, the
international environment in the 1980's should foster moderation on
both sides, thereby reducing the likelihood of war. The developing
U.S. and Japanese ties with China may become a significant force in
promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula if care is taken to avoid
provoking the Soviet Union.
The relative equality of the military forces in both Koreas has
been established in previous chapters. Barring external intervention,
there is little reason to expect this situation to change until the
mid-1980' s when the advantage should shift to South Korea because of
the growing gap between the sizes of the economies of the two Koreas,
and the level of satisfaction in indigenous production. If the effects
of military expenditures and labor drain on economic growth are
included, South Korea will have an even greater advantage.
Although both Korean Governments are placing emphasis on economic
growth in the 1980's, it will become increasingly difficult for North
Korea to keep pace with the South. Recent actions by North Korea
indicate that a more pragmatic approach toward economic matters is
being taken. If these trends continue into the 1980' s, North Korea
will shift resources from the military to industrial sectors of the




Relations between the two Koreas will most likely develop into an
atmosphere of detente, largely because of North Korea's inability to
compete economically. The only viable alternative to detente is for
North Korea to shift to a more dependent position with the Soviet Union
to gain aid needed to continue military and economic competition with
the South, in which case, it would be expected that the atmosphere of
confrontation would become more hostile.
A. STATUS QUO
To meet the growing economic and military pressures from the South,
North Korea may turn to their major allies for increased economic and
military assistance. Currently, North Korea seems to be tilting toward
the Chinese camp. China could become a significant force in promoting
stability on the Korean Peninsula because of its relationship with
North Korea, and the growing ties with the U.S. and Japan. It is
unlikely that military aid from China would cause a significant shift
in the military balance in Korea because the technological level of
Chinese weaponry (excluding nuclear) is equivalent to that of North
Korea. However, economic aid from China would help North Korea
alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks and to become more competitive
with South Korea.
However, as North Korea faces increasingly sophisticated weaponry
produced by its adversary to the South, increased pressure will be
brought to bear on the government to improve relations with the Soviet
Union. This pressure will occur because the Soviet Union produces
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the level of sophisticated equipment needed to offset the gains made
by the South, China does not.
The most likely event that would tilt North Korea toward the Soviet
camp would be for a military leader to succeed Kim II -sung. Upon Kim's
death, the military leaders will have a major say in the selection of a
successor. If strong opposition to Kim Chong II develops in factions
of the military elite, then a senior military leader could rise to power.
If a shift to the Soviet camp does occur, and the Soviets are will-
ing to provide sophisticated weapons to North Korea, it could be expected
that the threat of confrontation would increase. The level of equipment
needed by North Korea to offset possible gains by the South could prove
costly to the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union introduces a new level
of weaponry to the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. would most likely counter
with equal technological aid for South Korea. South Korea is economi-
cally in a better position to pay for advanced weaponry than North Korea,
therefore, in effect, the Soviet Union would be paying for North Korea'a
competition with the South.
Even if there is a shift in North Korean policy toward the Soviet
Union, it is unlikely that the Soviets would increase the level of
weapons sophistication above that obtained by the South Koreans. Both
the Soviet Union and the United States have shown restraint in provid-
ing highly sophisticated military equipment to their respective Korean
allies. Although relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union are currently strained, there is no indication that this de facto
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control policy would end. Also, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union
would allow South Korea to obtain a significant advantage in sophisti-
cated weaponry.
The burden of maintaining the status quo will fall on North Korea.
As indicated in Chapter V, South Korea is less adversely affected by
resource constraints on military expansion than is North Korea. The
futility of attempting to obtain a military advantage over South Korea
will become increasingly clear as South Korea's population and economic
advantage broadens in the 1980' s.
B. DETENTE
A more likely direction in the relationship between North and
South Korea is for an atmosphere of detente to develop. Due to
economic realities, North Korea will be unable to continue military
competition with the South. Even if defense spending had equal impact
on North and South Korea, South Korea would have a comparative advan-
tage because of its larger population and GNP base. However, since
North Korea is more adversely affected by defense spending, and has a
larger drain on its human resources, to maintain relative equality
with South Korea it is futile for North Korea to continue hostilities
toward the South.
As South Korean economic and military capabilities grow, there
could be an increased willingness to make concessions that would
facilitate North Korea's acceptance of peaceful coexistence. The
future of North/South relationship hinges largely on the leadership
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of the two Koreas, A stable leadership must exist in both North and
South Korea before meaningful dialog can occur. Currently, South Korea's
leadership, under Chun, is trying to establish control. If economic
stability is not brought to South Korea, or if domestic unrest continues,
then there is likely to be another coup d'etat in South Korea.
In North Korea a peaceful change of leadership is apt to place Kim
Chong II in control. One likely possibility is that he would be more
apt to pursue the nationalistic goals established by his father than
would a military leader. Although little is known about Kim Chong II,
perhaps he would be more receptive to South Korean overtures than would
be a military leader, because Kim Chong II did not personally experience
the bitterness of the Korean War.
C. CONCLUSION
It can be concluded from this study that both North and South Korea
place a great amount of emphasis on national security. Currently, the
Korean Peninsula is probably the most mobilized area in the world that
is not at war. North Korea has the world's fifth largest army, and
South Korea's is the sixth. Additionally, both countries have large
reserve and para-military forces. 3oth are capable of defending their
nations against an attack by the other. For either to pursue a policy
of domination, a massive and prolonged buildup would have to occur
without the other side taking action to correct the growing imbalance.
Considering the leadership in both Koreas today, an imbalance of this
magnitude is not likely to happen.
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Another finding of this study is that North Korea's economy is
adversely affected by military spending while South Korea's economy
has shown positive effects. Financial constraints, caused by poor
economic performance and cuts in aid, have forced North Korea to
sacrifice economic growth to maintain defense expenditures. Conversely,
South Korea has been able to maintain high economic growth and military
spending because they enjoy a relative abundance of financial resources.
A corallary finding is that the opportunity cost of maintaining a
large military force is higher for North Korea than for South Korea
because of the South Korean population advantage.
During the 1980' s, economics will play a key role in stability
on the Korean Peninsula. If economic hardships befall South Korea,
political instability will occur. This would further worsen the state
of South Korea's economy because foreign investors would be reluctant
to commit themselves. Events stemming from economic instability could
lead to another coup d'etat in South Korea.
Although South Korea has suffered economic setbacks since the death
of President Park, the changes made by the Chun Government seems to
have been timely and correct. If Chun is able to lead South Korea to
economic recovery, then South Korea will far outpace North Korea
economically and militarily in the 1980' s.
Economics also plays an important role in North Korea's future.
Although North Korea has demonstrated a willingness to commit large
amounts of resources to national defense, there is a limit to which
these resources can be exploited. Economic realities confronting
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north Korea in the 1980' s will demonstrate the futility of attempting
to dominate a foe with more than twice the population and five times
the GNP. If North Korea wishes to attain its ambitious economic
goals for the 1980' s, more of its resources need to be devoted to
economic development. This will require cuts in military spending
because of the adverse effect it has on economic growth.
There is, indeed, reason to be optimistic about the prospects
for peace on the Korean Peninsula. An atmosphere of detente offers
the best prospects for economic growth. Opportunities also lie in
increased stability on the Korean Peninsula because of the developing
relationships between the U.S. and the Japanese with China. Barring
unforseen developments, the Korean Peninsula will have a more stable





MAJOR ARMS TRANSFERS TO NORTH KOREA, 1950-1979
Date Sup- Date
Order plier* Quan Item Del'd Remarks








450 T-34 Tank 1950-52
1951 35 Tu-2 1951-52
10 11-12 1951-52






15 Yak-17 UTI 1953
15 MIG-15 UTI 1953







1955 30 11-28 1955
1956 100 MIG-17 1956-58
12 Motor Torpedo Boats
"P4" Type
1956





China 24 Inshore Minesweeper 1957-60
1958 China 80 MIG-15 1958




Order plier* Quan Item Del'd Remarks
1958 China 4 I1-28U 1958-59
China 20 Shenyang Yak- 18 1958-59 Supplement tnose
supplied oefore
'50 by Soviets















































1967 70 T-54/55 1967
2 Submarine "W" Class 1967




China 4 Patrol Boat "Shanghai" 1967







390 K-13 "Atoll" AAM 1968-71














1971 132 "Styx" ShShm 1971-72 To arm 8 "OSA"























































1976 China 2 Submarine "Romeo-L" 1976
1978 MIG-23?
^Supplier is the Soviet Union unless indicated in this column. More
often than not, "date ordered" and "number ordered" are not available.
Information on arms transfers to North Korea is sketchy and difficult
to obtain.
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p. 29; (Extracted from: "Arms Transfers
Korean Peninsula 1945-1980: Impact and




MAJOR ARMS TRANSFERS TO SOUTH KOREA, 1950-1979
Date Sup- Date
Order plier* Quan Item Del'd Remarks
1950 75 NA F-51 Mustang 1950-52
15 Piper L-4 1950-52
15 Douglas C-47 1950-52
20 Curtiss C-46D 1950-53
2 Frigate, "Tacoma" Class 1950 On loan
1 Patrol Boat "PC" 1950
100 M-Sherman Tanks 1950-51
50 i'1-5 Stuart 1950-51
50 M-24 Chaffee 1950-53
70 M-10 1950-53
200 M-8 Greyhound 1950-59
1951 500 M47/M48 Patton Tank 1951-66
2 Frigate, "Tacoma" Class 1951
4 Patrol Boat "PC" 1951
1952 4 Patrol Boat "PCS" 1952
4 Motor Torpedo Boat 1952
1953 1 Frigate, "Tacoma" Class 1953 Replacement
Norway 2 Oiler 1953
1954 70 M-36 1954-60
3 Aero Cdr 520 Aircraft 1954
1955 5 iiA F-86F Sabre 1955
1 Oiler 1955 On Loan
2 Tank Landing Ship 1955
2 Escort "PCE" Ships 1955 On Loan
6 Supply Ship 1955-57
1956 2 Escort "PCD" Ships 1956




9 Medium Landing Ship 1956
3 Coastal Minesweepers 1956
75 NA F-86F Sabre 1956 10-20 Converted
to Recce Version




Order plier* Quan Item DeTd Remarks
1957 4 Coastal Minesweepers 1957 Decommissioned
in 1962
3 Medium Landing Ships 1957
9 Lockheed T-33A 1957
5 Cessna 0-1 A Birddog 1957 Recce Plane
1958 30 NA F-86F Sabre 1958
3 Tank Landing Ship 1958
12 Honest John SSM 1959
2 Tank Landing Ship 1959
1 Escort Transport 1959 Modified Des-
troyer Escort
3 Coastal Minesweeper 1959 MPA Transfer
1960 1 Rocket Landing Ship 1960
2 Patrol Boat "PC" 1960
1 Landing Craft Repair
Ship
1960
30 NA F-86D Sabre 1960-62 Equipped w/360
Sidewinder AAM
5 Cessna LC-130 1960
1961 4 Escort, "PCE" Type 1961
150 M-113 APC 1961-65
1962 2 Tug 1962
30 NA F-86D Sabre 1962 Equipped w/
Sidewinder AAM
16 NA T-28 1962
1963 1 Destroyer "Fletcher" 1963
1 Frigate "Rudderow" Class 1963
1 Escort "Auk" Class 1963
2 Coastal Minesweeper 1963 MAP Transfer
1964 1 Patrol Boat "PC" 1964
8 Cessna 185 Skywagon 1964
1965 15 Cessna 0-1 E Birddog 1965
30 F-5A Freedom Fighter 1965-66
150 HAWK SAM 1965
25 Nike Hercules SAM 1965
4 Curtiss C-46D 1965-66 MAP
50 105mm Howitzer 1965-66




Order plier* Quan Item Del'c Remarks







60 203mm Howitzer 1966- 67 MAP.
1967 5 Douglas C-54 1967
2 Curtiss C-46 1967- 68 MAP
5 Cessna 0-1A Birddog 1967- 68 MAP
3 Escort Transport 1967 2 Transferred
Under MAP








1 Coastal Minesweeper 1968 MAP
1 Coastal Minesweeper 1970 MAP




9 Patrol Boats 1968- 69
1969 19 F-4E Phantom 1969 $52m - ROK
$48m - US MAP
5 Bell UH-ID Helicopters 1969 $2. 4m
70C1,000 M-l Rifles 1969
1971 M-16 Rifle Factory 1971 $10m Factory
Contract Replaced
















50 203mm Howitzers 1971 MAP
50 M-113A APC 1971 MAP
50 M-60 Tanks 1971 Trans f/US 7th Div
50 Ml 07 Howitzer 1971
50 M-48A2C Patton Tank 1971 MAP
1 Patrol Boat 1971
1 Oiler 1971













2 Destroyer "Gearing" CI 1972 On Loan
4 Pazmany PL-2 Light 1972 Built for
Aircraft Evaluation






1975-76 To Arm F-5Es




1 Patrol Boat 1973
2 Coastal Minesweeper 1975 MAP






3 Fast Patrol Boats PSMM 1973-74 $16m Credit
2 HS 748 Transports 1974
4 Coastal Patrol 1977-2 3 others being
"Tacoma" Class produced by SK
under license
7 Fast Patrol Boats PSMM 1975-2
1976-2
1977-3
40 Standard ShShM 1975-77 8 Launchers-Use
w/PSMM Ships
Solid Fuel Rocket 1975
Motor Plant from
Lockheed Corp.
19 F-4E Phantom Fighters 1978-79

















600 AIM 96 Sidewinder AAM
1 "Casa-Grande" Class
Dock Landing Ship
2 "Gearing" CI Destroyers






















































Bell AH-1J Heli Gunship 1977
Fairchild C-123 Transport 1977
Hughes-500M Defender 1977-30
He! Missile
Nike Hercules SAM 1977
AIM-7E 1979
Bell UH-iH Cobra Heli.
Bell UH-18 Heli. 1977
Laser Guided Bomb Kits 1977
Lockheed C-130H Hercules
Transports




4 Del in '76 w/o
arms; arms: TOW ATM
$53. 2m; part of



























18 F-4E Phantom Fighter
24 Honest John SSM
15 M-88 Al Tank Recovery
Vehicle
MIM-23B Hawk SAM
? MM-38 Exocet ShShM
72 A-10A Fighter
? M-48A3 Tanks
6 CH-47C Chinook Heli.
2208 Hughes BGM-71A-1
Air-to-Surface TOW ATM
4 Patrol Ship "Asheville"
37 M-109A2 SP Howitzer
1 Patrol Boat "Grasp"
1800 Hughes BGM-71A TOW
ATM s/10 Launchers
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